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Abstract
This paper studies the e®ect of technology spillovers on the entry
decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two al-
ternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered:
Green¯eld investment versus acquisition. We ¯nd that with quantity
competition a spillover makes acquisitions less attractive, while with
price competition acquisitions become more attractive. Asymmetric
information about potential spillovers always reduces the number of
acquisitions independently of whether the host country or the entrant
has private information. Interestingly, we ¯nd that asymmetric infor-
mation always hurts the entrant, while it sometimes is in favor of the
host country.
J E L -c la s s i¯ c a t io n n u m b e r s : D 4 3 , F2 1 , F2 3 , L 1 3 , P 3 1 .
K e ywo r d s : Fo r e ig n d ir e c t in ve s t m e n t , m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e , e n t r y m o d e ,
t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s , a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n , t r a n s it io n e c o n o m ie s .
¤I w ou ld lik e to th an k Mon ik a S ch n itzer for h elp fu l com m en ts an d su ggestion s. Fin an cial su p p or t
th r ou gh Deu tsch e For sch u n gsgem ein sch aft gr an t S ch n 422/2-1 is gr atefu lly ack n ow led ged .
y Dep ar tm en t of E con om ics, U n iv er sity of Mu n ich , A k ad em iestr . 1/III, 80799 Mu n ich , Ger m an y , T el.:
+49-89-2180 3953, Fax .: +49-89-2180 2767, e-m ail: T h om as.Mu eller @lr z.u n i-m u en ch en .d e
11 I ntr oduction
W h e n a m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e ( MN E ) e n t e r s a fo r e ig n m a r ke t t h is c a n
c a u s e e xt e r n a l e ®e c t s o n d o m e s t ic ¯ r m s . Fo r e ig n d ir e c t in ve s t m e n t ( FD I)
m a y, fo r e xa m p le , im p r o ve d o m e s t ic kn o w h o w t h r o u g h t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s .
If s u c h a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r b e n e ¯ t s a c o m p a n y wh ic h is a d ir e c t c o m p e t i-
t o r t o t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m , t h is e xt e r n a lit y n a t u r a lly is n o t in t h e in t e r e s t
o f t h e MN E . S t r a t e g ic a lly t h e r e a r e t wo ke y d e c is io n s fo r t h e m u lt in a t io n a l
e n t e r p r is e : Th e m o d e o f fo r e ig n e n t r y a n d t h e le ve l o f c o n t r o l o ve r t h e lo c a l
s u b s id ia r y. Th e le ve l o f c o n t r o l is a s s o c ia t e d wit h t h e o wn e r s h ip s t r u c t u r e .1
Th is in t u r n c e r t a in ly m a y b e in ° u e n c e d b y t h e p r o s p e c t o f a t e c h n o lo g y
s p illo ve r s in c e e n g a g e m e n t o f a lo c a l p a r t n e r m a y b e t h e r e a s o n fo r t h e e x-
t e r n a lit y t o c o m e u p a t a ll.2 W h a t is t h e e ®e c t o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n
t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e b e t we e n s e t t in g u p a n e w ve n t u r e via g r e e n ¯ e ld
in ve s t m e n t o r a c qu is it io n o f a lo c a l c o m p e t it o r ?
Th is p a p e r c o n t r ib u t e s t o a n s we r in g t h is qu e s t io n b y a n a lyz in g t h e e ®e c t
o f t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s o n t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e . In p a r t ic u la r , we a s k
t wo qu e s t io n s : W h a t is t h e e ®e c t o f t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s o n t h e e n t r y m o d e
c h o ic e u n d e r d i®e r e n t fo r m s o f c o m p e t it io n , i.e . qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n o r p r ic e
c o m p e t it io n ? H o w a ®e c t s a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r
t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e ? It is ve r y like ly t h a t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e
a n d a lo c a l c o m p e t it o r h a ve d i®e r e n t in fo r m a t io n c o n c e r n in g s u c h in t a n g ib le
a s s e t s like kn o w h o w a n d t e c h n o lo g y. Th e MN E , fo r e xa m p le , m ig h t h a ve
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n wh e t h e r o r n o t lo c a l wo r ke r s will b e e m p lo ye d a n d
g e t in c o n t a c t wit h s e n s ib le in fo r m a t io n . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e m a y b e
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m wh e t h e r it s wo r ke r s o r m a n a g e r s
a r e we ll e n o u g h t r a in e d t o b e c a p a b le o f e m p lo yin g a d va n c e d t e c h n o lo g ie s .
Fo r e ig n d ir e c t in ve s t m e n t a s a c h a n n e l o f t e c h n o lo g y t r a n s fe r h a s b e e n
1The notion of ownership as entitling the owner with the residual control rights over
the asset has been put forward by Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990].
2In MÄ uller and Schnitzer [2002] we analyze the e®ect of a potential spillover on the in-
centive to transfer technology and how incentives can be controlled through the ownership
structure in international joint ventures.
2a n a lyz e d t h e o r e t ic a lly, fo r e xa m p le , in Fin d la y [1 9 7 8 ], D a s [1 9 8 7 ] o r W a n g
a n d B lo m s t r Äo m [1 9 9 2 ].3 On e o f t h e ir a r g u m e n t s is t h a t t h e t e c h n o lo g ic a l
p r o g r e s s in a d e ve lo p in g c o u n t r y d e p e n d s p o s it ive ly o n t h e t e c h n o lo g y g a p
a n d o n t h e s h a r e o f FD I in t h e c a p it a l s t o c k. Th e e m p ir ic a l lit e r a t u r e o n t h e
t r a n s fe r o f kn o w h o w a n d t e c h n o lo g y a c r o s s b o r d e r s id e n t i¯ e s m ixe d e vid e n c e
o n t h e im p a c t o f FD I o n t h e p r o d u c t ivit y o f d o m e s t ic ¯ r m s .4 K o kko [1 9 9 4 ],
B o r e n s z t e in , D e Gr e g o r io a n d L e e [1 9 9 8 ] a n d X u [2 0 0 0 ] fo u n d e vid e n c e t h a t
p o s it ive s p illo ve r s a r e m o r e like ly g e n e r a t e d , if t h e t e c h n o lo g y g a p is n o t t o o
la r g e a n d if t h e r e e xis t s a m in im u m t h r e s h o ld o f h u m a n c a p it a l.5 B o t h o f
t h e s e ¯ n d in g s a r e in lin e wit h t h e t h e o r e t ic a l r e s u lt s o f o u r m o d e l. On t h e
o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e a ls o e xis t s e vid e n c e fo r n e g a t ive s p illo ve r s fr o m fo r e ig n
in ve s t m e n t o n d o m e s t ic a lly o wn e d p la n t s , e .g . H a d d a d a n d H a r r is o n [1 9 9 3 ],
A it ke n a n d H a r r is o n [1 9 9 9 ] o r D ja n ko v a n d H o e km a n [2 0 0 0 ].6 H o we ve r , n o n e
o f a ll t h e s e s t u d ie s o n t e c h n o lo g y t r a n s fe r a n d s p illo ve r s m a ke s a d is t in c t io n
fo r t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e in FD I.
E ve n t h o u g h t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e is a n im p o r t a n t d e c is io n fo r t h e
o r g a n iz a t io n a l fo r m o f fo r e ig n d ir e c t in ve s t m e n t it h a s r e c e ive d r e la t ive ly lit -
t le a t t e n t io n in t h e e c o n o m ic lit e r a t u r e . E m p ir ic a lly a n u m b e r o f p o t e n t ia l
fa c t o r s in ° u e n c in g t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e h a ve b e e n s t u d ie d . K o g u t a n d
S in g h [1 9 9 8 ] fo u n d t h a t wit h a g r e a t e r c u lt u r a l d is t a n c e g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t
o r jo in t ve n t u r e s a r e m o r e like ly c h o s e n t h a n a c qu is it io n . Fo r in ve s t m e n t in
t h e U S t h e r e is e vid e n c e t h a t la r g e a n d d ive r s i¯ e d c o m p a n ie s p r e fe r a c qu i-
s it io n a s Ca ve s a n d Me h r a [1 9 8 6 ] s h o w. Th is ¯ n d in g g e t s s u p p o r t in Me ye r
3For recent surveys on international technology transfer and spillovers see Saggi [2001]
or BlomstrÄ om and Kokko [1998].
4International trade can be a source of spillovers too. Coe and Helpman [1995], Coe
Helpman and Ho®maister [1997], and Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
[1998] ¯nd evidence that foreign trade partners' R&D in°uences domestic total factor
productivity.
5Other studies which found positive e®ects from the presence of MNEs on the produc-
tivity of domestic ¯rms include, for example, the early studies by Caves [1974], Globerman
[1979] or BlomstrÄ om [1986].
6GÄ org and Strobl [2001] review the empirical literature on multinational companies
and productivity spillovers. They argue that the empirical methods used and whether
cross-section or panel analysis is employed can have an e®ect on the empirical results.
3[1 9 9 8 ] fo r e n t r y in t o Ce n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e . H e n n a r t a n d P a r k [1 9 9 3 ]
fo u n d t h a t g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is t h e p r e fe r e d m o d e o f e n t r y fo r R &D in -
t e n s ive Ja p a n e s e Fir m s fo r e n t r y in t o t h e U S . Th e ir r e s u lt s s u g g e s t t h a t
a c qu is it io n s a r e u s e d b y in ve s t o r s wit h we a k c o m p e t it ive a d va n t a g e s , wh ile
in ve s t o r s wit h s t r o n g a d va n t a g e s ¯ n d t h a t g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is a m o r e e f-
¯ c ie n t e n t r y m o d e .7 B o t h o f t h e s e ¯ n d in g s a r e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e t h e o r e t ic a l
r e s u lt s o f o u r m o d e l. W e s h o w t h a t a c qu is it io n is t h e e ± c ie n t m o d e o f e n t r y
wh e n t e c h n o lo g ie s a r e s u ± c ie n t ly s im ila r , wh ile g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is t h e
p r e fe r e d c h o ic e wh e n t h e MN E p o s s e s s e s a ve r y s u p e r io r t e c h n o lo g y.
Th e r e a r e o n ly a fe w t h e o r e t ic a l p a p e r s d e a lin g wit h t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y
m o d e in fo r e ig n d ir e c t in ve s t m e n t . B u c kle y a n d Ca s s o n [1 9 9 8 ], GÄo r g [2 0 0 0 ]
a n d MÄu lle r [2 0 0 1 ] a n a lyz e t h e e ®e c t o f m a r ke t s t r u c t u r e a n d c o m p e t it io n
in t e n s it y o n t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e . Ma t t o o , Ola r r e a g a a n d S a g g i [2 0 0 1 ]
e xa m in e h o w t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e a ®e c t s t h e e xt e n d o f t e c h n o lo g y t r a n s -
fe r a n d t h e d e g r e e o f c o m p e t it io n in t h e h o s t c o u n t r y.8 Th e s e a p p r o a c h e s ,
h o we ve r , n e it h e r t a ke a c c o u n t o f t h e e ®e c t o f t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s n o r o f
a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n o n t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e .
In a r e c e n t p a p e r , D a s a n d S e n g u p t a [2 0 0 1 ] a n a lyz e t h e e ®e c t o f a s ym -
m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n a b o u t d i®e r e n t p a yo ® r e le va n t va r ia b le s o n t h e fo r m a t io n
o f in t e r n a t io n a l m e r g e r s . In p a r t ic u la r , t h e y in ve s t ig a t e t wo s c e n a r io s , o n e
wh e r e a lo c a l ¯ r m h a s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n m a r ke t s iz e a n d o n e wh e r e
a fo r e ig n ¯ r m h a s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n it s o wn t e c h n o lo g y. Th e ir m a in
¯ n d in g is t h a t p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n m a y b e a h in d r a n c e t o t h e fo r m a t io n o f
m e r g e r s . H o we ve r , t h e y a s s u m e t h a t m e r g e r is t h e p r e fe r r e d m o d e o f e n t r y in
c a s e o f fu ll in fo r m a t io n . H e n c e , a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n m a y r e s u lt in fe we r ,
b u t it c a n n o t r e s u lt in m o r e m e r g e r s .
In c o n t r a s t t o t h e ir a p p r o a c h o u r m o d e l a llo ws fo r b o t h e n t r y m o d e s t o
b e e ± c ie n t in t h e ¯ r s t p la c e . Mo r e o ve r , we a n a lyz e t h e e ®e c t o f a s ym m e t r ic
in fo r m a t io n o ve r t h e s a m e va r ia b le in b o t h s c e n a r io s o f p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n .
Th e r e fo r e , we a r e a b le t o e xa m in e t h e b a s ic e ®e c t o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r
7Andersson and Svensson [1994] found similar results for Swedish multinational ¯rms.
8See also Bjorvatn [2001] and NorbÄ ack and Persson [2002] for theoretical models of the
choice of entry mode.
4o n b o t h t yp e s o f e n t r y m o d e a n d t h e e ®e c t o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n o ve r
t h e e xt e r n a lit y o n t h e s t r a t e g ic e n t r y c h o ic e . W e c o n s id e r a m u lt in a t io n a l
e n t e r p r is e in p o s s e s s io n o f a s u p e r io r t e c h n o lo g y wh ic h c a n b e e m p lo ye d in
a g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t . In t h is c a s e a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r c a n o c c u r t o t h e
s in g le lo c a l c o m p e t it o r t h e r e b y we a ke n in g t h e c o m p e t it ive a d va n t a g e o f t h e
MN E . A lt e r n a t ive ly t h e MN E c o u ld a c qu ir e it s c o m p e t it o r a n d t h e r e b y a vo id
t h e p r o s p e c t o f a s p illo ve r . H o we ve r , in t h is c a s e o n ly t h e in fe r io r t e c h n o lo g y
o f t h e a c qu ir e d c o m p a n y c a n b e a d o p t e d .
Th e a c qu is it io n p r ic e a n d t h e p r o ¯ t s fo r b o t h ¯ r m s c o n c e r n in g b o t h e n t r y
m o d e s a r e e n d o g e n o u s ly d e t e r m in e d . Th e s e s va lu e s wh ic h a r e c r u c ia l t o t h e
e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e o b vio u s ly d e p e n d o n m a r ke t c h a r a c t e r is t ic s , o n t h e p o -
t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r , a n d o n t h e t e c h n o lo g y d i®e r e n c e b e t we e n b o t h
¯ r m s . In t e r e s t in g ly, we ¯ n d t h a t t h e e ®e c t o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e
e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e c r u c ia lly d e p e n d s o n t h e n a t u r e o f c o m p e t it io n . W it h
qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r is a h in d r a n c e t o a c qu is it io n s .
H o we ve r , wit h p r ic e c o m p e t it io n a n d h o r iz o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t s we
o b t a in e xa c t ly t h e o p p o s it e r e s u lt . Th e e ®e c t s o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n
a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e a r e in d e p e n -
d e n t o f t h e fo r m o f c o m p e t it io n . W e a ls o ¯ n d t h a t p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n in d e e d
h a s a n e g a t ive e ®e c t o n t h e o ve r a ll a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y. In c o n t r a s t t o D a s
a n d S e n g u p t a [2 0 0 1 ] we s h o w t h a t u n d e r c e r t a in c o n d it io n s p r iva t e in fo r m a -
t io n m a y r e s u lt in a c qu is it io n s wh ic h wo u ld n o t h a ve t a ke n p la c e u n d e r fu ll
in fo r m a t io n . Fin a lly, we ¯ n d t h a t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m e x a n t e p r e fe r s fu ll
in fo r m a t io n r a t h e r t h a n p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n . Th is is p a r t ic u la r ly s u r p r is in g
g ive n t h e fa c t t h a t t h e MN E m a ke s t h e a c qu is it io n o ®e r a n d s h o u ld t h e r e b y
b e a b le t o t a ke a d va n t a g e o f it s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n . Th e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m ,
h o we ve r , is b e t t e r o ® wit h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r .
Th e r e s t o f t h is p a p e r is o r g a n iz e d a s fo llo ws . Th e n e xt s e c t io n s e t s u p
t h e b a s ic m o d e l. In s e c t io n 3 , we d e t e r m in e t h e o p t im a l m o d e o f e n t r y u n d e r
fu ll in fo r m a t io n . S e c t io n 4 a n d s e c t io n 5 a n a lyz e t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e
u n d e r t wo s c e n a r io s o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y
s p illo ve r . In s e c t io n 6 , we c o m p a r e t h e d i®e r e n t in fo r m a t io n a l s c e n a r io s fr o m
a n e x a n t e p e r s p e c t ive . Th e ¯ n a l s e c t io n d is c u s s e s e xt e n s io n s a n d c o n c lu d e s .
52 T he M odel
Co n s id e r a m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e ( MN E ) t h a t e n t e r s a fo r e ig n m a r ke t . Th is
m a r ke t is c u r r e n t ly s e r ve d b y a s in g le d o m e s t ic ¯ r m ( H C) . To e n t e r t h e m a r -
ke t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m 2 c a n e it h e r a c qu ir e t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m 1 o r s e t u p
a n e w ve n t u r e via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t . A p a r t fr o m t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m
t h e r e is n o o t h e r p o t e n t ia l e n t r a n t . B o t h ¯ r m s i = 1 ;2 p r o d u c e a t c o n s t a n t
m a r g in a l c o s t ci wit h n o ¯ xe d c o s t . Th e e n t e r in g MN E e m p lo ys a s u p e r io r
t e c h n o lo g y t h a n t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m 1 ( ¹c1 > c2 ¸ 0 ) . Th is a s s u m p t io n r e ° e c t s
t h e fa c t t h a t a d o m e s t ic ¯ r m lo c a t e d in a c o u n t r y like in Ce n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n
E u r o p e o r a d e ve lo p in g c o u n t r y h a s n o a c c e s s t o a d va n c e d t e c h n o lo g ie s .
Th e p r e s e n c e o f a m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m m a y h a ve a n im p a c t o n t h e t e c h n o -
lo g ic a l c a p a b ilit ie s o f t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m b y in d u c in g a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . A
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t m ig h t , fo r e xa m p le , r e s u lt in a t u r n o ve r o f t r a in e d wo r k-
e r s fr o m t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m t o t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m t h e r e b y im p r o vin g t h e
kn o w h o w o f t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m . Th e r e a r e m a n y o t h e r ve n u e s o n e c a n t h in k
o f fo r t h e ° o w o f in fo r m a t io n o r kn o w h o w. Of c o u r s e a n a c qu is it io n c o u ld
a ls o le a d t o a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . H o we ve r , in o u r m o d e l a n a c qu is it io n
c a n o n ly c a u s e a s p illo ve r in t o a n o t h e r in d u s t r y s in c e t h e r e e xis t s n o o t h e r
¯ r m . A t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r in o u r m o d e l s im p ly r e s u lt s in a r e d u c t io n o f t h e
p r o d u c t io n c o s t fo r t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m 1 t o c1 s u c h t h a t ¹c1 > c1 ¸ c2 ¸ 0 .9
Th e s p illo ve r o c c u r s wit h p r o b a b ilit y q 2 ( 0 ;1 ) , b u t t h e p a r t ie s m a y h a ve
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n wh e t h e r o r n o t g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t d o e s le a d t o a
t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . W e a s s u m e t h a t , if a n e w ve n t u r e is s e t u p , in fo r m a t io n
is r e ve a le d a n d b o t h p a r t ie s c o m p e t e in qu a n t it ie s u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n .10
Th e m a r ke t d e m a n d is r e p r e s e n t e d b y a s im p le lin e a r d e m a n d fu n c t io n
p = a ¡ x, wh e r e t h e t o t a l qu a n t it y s o ld is d e n o t e d b y x. In o r d e r fo r a ll
p r o ¯ t s t o b e n o n -n e g a t ive we im p o s e t h e fo llo win g r e s t r ic t io n o n m a r ke t s iz e :
a ¸ 2 ¹c1 ¡ c2:
9Thus, the technology spillover can result in a full reduction of the production cost in
the sense that c1 = c2 or only a partial reduction c1 > c2.
10This is for simplicity. Otherwise we get results for incomplete information competition
which simply would make the model more complicated.
6W h e n e n t e r in g b y a c qu is it io n t h e e n t r a n t h a s t o u s e t h e a c qu ir e d ¯ r m 's
t e c h n o lo g y ¹c1.11 If in s t e a d t h e e n t r a n t s e t s u p a n e w ve n t u r e h e c a n im p le -
m e n t t h e s u p e r io r t e c h n o lo g y c2. Fo r s im p lic it y t h e in ve s t m e n t c o s t fo r a
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is a s s u m e d t o b e k = 0 . H e n c e , b y a s s u m p t io n g r e e n -
¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is a lwa ys a via b le o p p o r t u n it y a n d m a r ke t e n t r y b y MN E
will a lwa ys o c c u r .12 Th e e n t r y c o s t in c a s e o f a c qu is it io n is e qu a l t o t h e
a c qu is it io n p r ic e s in c e n o o t h e r c o s t like a n a d a p t a t io n c o s t is in vo lve d . Th is
a c qu is it io n p r ic e , PA, is e n d o g e n o u s ly d e t e r m in e d . Th e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r -
p r is e c a n m a ke a t a ke -it -o r -le a ve -it o ®e r t o a c qu ir e ¯ r m 1 .13
Th e t im e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e e n t r y g a m e is t h e fo llo win g :
A t s t a g e 1 , ¯ r m 2 ( MN E ) c a n c h o o s e b e t we e n m a kin g a t a ke -it -o r -le a ve -it
o ®e r t o a c qu ir e ¯ r m 1 ( H C) , g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t o r n o m a r ke t e n t r y.
A t s t a g e 2 , if ¯ r m 2 h a s m a d e a n o ®e r , t h e in c u m b e n t ¯ r m 1 c a n a c c e p t o r
r e je c t t h e o ®e r .
A t s t a g e 3 , ¯ r m 2 e n t e r s via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t in c a s e ¯ r m 1 h a s t u r n e d
t h e o ®e r d o wn .
A t s t a g e 4 , ¯ r m s e n t e r c o m p e t it io n a n d p r o ¯ t s a r e r e a liz e d .
S o lvin g t h is g a m e b y b a c kwa r d s in d u c t io n yie ld s t h e s u b -g a m e p e r fe c t
e qu ilib r iu m o f t h e b a r g a in in g g a m e . Th e e xa c t va lu e o f t h e a c qu is it io n o ®e r
d e p e n d s o n t h e in fo r m a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e a n d o n t h e n a t u r e o f c o m p e t it io n .
W it h r e s p e c t t o s t a g e 4 we will a n a lyz e in t h e fo llo win g s e c t io n t h e e ®e c t o f
a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e fo r qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n a n d
b e s id e s t h a t fo r p r ic e c o m p e t it io n . Th e r e fo r e , we c o n s id e r a s t a n d a r d m o d e l
o f h o r iz o n t a l p r o d u c t d i®e r e n t ia t io n . Co n s u m e r s a r e u n ifo r m ly d is t r ib u t e d
a lo n g t h e u n it in t e r va l [0 ,1 ] wit h d e n s it y 1 . Th e y r e c e ive t h e s u r p lu s s fr o m
c o n s u m p t io n o f t h e g o o d b u t in c u r a lin e a r t r a n s p o r t a t io n c o s t t. H C is
11We could also assume that the entrant can implement its own technology by adapting
the production facility which would involve additional costs. This would give us the same
qualitative results.
12Otherwise for k > 0 green¯eld investment might sometimes not be viable and therefore
no credible option which in turn can prevent any entry at all as shown in MÄ uller [2001].
13This constitutes a lower bound for the acquisition price. Other bargaining frameworks,
where HC has bargaining power, too, obviously would lead to a higher acquisition price
and thus shift preferences of the MNE in favor of green¯eld investment.
7lo c a t e d a t x = 0 .MN E c a n c h o o s e b e t we e n a c qu is it io n o f H C o r a g r e e n ¯ e ld
in ve s t m e n t in x = 1 .
3 E ntr y M ode Choice under Full I nfor mation
To b e g in wit h , c o n s id e r t h e fu ll-in fo r m a t io n c a s e wh e r e b o t h p a r t ie s kn o w
wh e t h e r a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o c c u r s o r n o t . S in c e g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is b y
a s s u m p t io n a lwa ys via b le t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e PA in e qu ilib r iu m is e qu a l t o
¯ r m 1 's p o s t -g r e e n ¯ e ld e n t r y p r o ¯ t d e n o t e d b y ¼1( ¹c1;c2) if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s
o r ¼1( c1;c2) in c a s e o f a s p illo ve r . Th u s , MN E e it h e r c h o o s e s a c qu is it io n a t
p r ic e PA e qu a l t o ¯ r m 1 's g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t o r g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t a t k = 0
o t h e r wis e .
De¯nition 1 ¹¼i = ¼i( ¹c1;c2) , ¼i = ¼i( c1;c2) , ¼M
1 = ¼M
1 ( ¹c1) .
W it h o u t a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r a c qu is it io n a t p r ic e PA = ¹¼1 t a ke s p la c e
wh e n e ve r
¼
M
1 ¸ ¹¼1 + ¹¼2: ( 1 )
In c a s e o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r a c qu is it io n a t p r ic e PA = ¼1 t a ke s p la c e
wh e n e ve r
¼
M
1 ¸ ¼1 + ¼2: ( 2 )
H o w a r e t h e p r o ¯ t s o f b o t h p a r t ie s a n d a s a r e s u lt t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e
a ®e c t e d b y a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r ? Th e s p illo ve r o n ly o c c u r s wh e n g r e e n ¯ e ld
in ve s t m e n t is c h o s e n , b u t it c a n b e a vo id e d b y a c qu is it io n o f t h e lo c a l c o m -
p e t it o r . H e n c e , a c qu is it io n h a s t h e a d va n t a g e o f b e c o m in g a m o n o p o lis t a n d
a vo id in g a p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r , b u t it h a s t h e d is a d va n t a g e o f a r e s t r ic t io n t o
a n in fe r io r t e c h n o lo g y. W it h g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t t h e t e c h n o lo g ic a l a d va n -
t a g e c a n b e e xp lo it e d , b u t t h e n t h e r e is c o m p e t it io n a n d a ls o t h e p o s s ib ilit y
o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . A s a r e s u lt o f t h is it is n o t c le a r in wh ic h d ir e c t io n
t h e s e e ®e c t s in ° u e n c e t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e . It c o u ld b e a r g u e d t h a t a c qu is i-
t io n b e c o m e s m o r e a t t r a c t ive if a s p illo ve r o c c u r s t h a n in a s it u a t io n wit h o u t
a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s in c e t h e n t h e r e is le s s n e e d fo r a n a c qu is it io n . Th u s ,
8m o r e a c qu is it io n s s h o u ld b e e xp e c t e d in c a s e o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r .14
Quantity competition
A s a c o n s e qu e n c e o f a s p illo ve r o n t h e o n e h a n d t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e in c r e a s e ,
wh ile o n t h e o t h e r t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r MN E d e c r e a s e s s in c e o b vio u s ly
¼1 > ¹¼1 a n d ¹¼2 > ¼2. A p r io r i it is n o t c le a r wh ic h o f t h e s e t wo e ®e c t s d o m i-
n a t e s . Fo r s o m e p a r a m e t e r c o n s t e lla t io n s t h e e ®e c t o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t is
s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e e ®e c t o n t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e , wh ile fo r o t h e r p a r a m e t e r s it
is t h e o t h e r wa y r o u n d .15 S u r p r is in g ly, h o we ve r , we c a n s h o w t h a t e ve n if t h e
e ®e c t o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t d o m in a t e s , t h e r e is a n u n a m b ig u o u s t e n d e n c y
c o n c e r n in g t h e im p a c t o f a s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e : A t e c h n o lo g y
s p illo ve r r e s u lt s in fe we r a c qu is it io n s .
P r oposition 1 W ith quantity competition a technology spillover reduces the
parameter space for which acquisition is the optimal entry mode.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
H e n c e , wit h qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r r e s u lt s in fe we r a c -
qu is it io n s c o m p a r e d t o a s it u a t io n wit h o u t s p illo ve r s . Th e in t u it io n fo r t h is
in t e r e s t in g r e s u lt is t h e fo llo win g . If t h e e ®e c t o n t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e d o m i-
n a t e s , t h e im p a c t o n t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e is r a t h e r n a t u r a l. Mo r e o ve r , t h e
e ®e c t o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r MN E d o m in a t e s o n ly if t h e d i®e r e n c e in
t e c h n o lo g ie s is r e la t ive ly la r g e . A s a c o n s e qu e n c e t h e r e is n o fu r t h e r in c e n -
t ive t o a c qu ir e s in c e t h e m o n o p o ly p r o ¯ t t h e n is c o m p a r a b ly s m a ll r e la t ive t o
t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r MN E . Th e r e fo r e , e ve n t h o u g h t h e n e g a t ive e ®e c t o f
a s p illo ve r o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t s o m e t im e s d o m in a t e s , t h is e ®e c t is n e ve r
s t r o n g e n o u g h t o c h a n g e t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e fr o m g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t
( wit h o u t a s p illo ve r ) t o a c qu is it io n ( wit h a s p illo ve r ) . Co n s e qu e n t ly, c o n d i-
t io n ( 2 ) is m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n c o n d it io n ( 1 ) .
14In our model, either acquisition is chosen or not, in which case there is green¯eld
investment. Thus, the number of acquisitions is either 1 or 0. By more acquisitions we
mean that the condition for which acquisition takes place is less restrictive if a technology
spillover occurs.
15See Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
9P r ice competition
H o w r o b u s t is t h is r e s u lt t h a t a s p illo ve r , wh ic h c o u ld b e a vo id e d b y a c qu is i-
t io n , r e s u lt s in fe we r a c qu is it io n s ? S u p p o s e ¯ r m s we r e t o c o m p e t e in p r ic e s ,
e a c h p r o d u c in g a h o r iz o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t . A g a in , a s p illo ve r in -
c r e a s e s t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e o n t h e o n e h a n d , b u t t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r
MN E d e c r e a s e s o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i.e . ¼1 > ¹¼1 a n d ¹¼2 > ¼2. In c o n t r a s t
t o t h e c a s e o f qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n t h e e ®e c t o f a s p illo ve r o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld
p r o ¯ t ( n e a r ly) a lwa ys d o m in a t e s t h e e ®e c t o n t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e .16 Fu r -
t h e r m o r e , t h is e ®e c t is s t r o n g e n o u g h t o c h a n g e t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e fr o m
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t ( wit h o u t a s p illo ve r ) t o a c qu is it io n ( wit h a s p illo ve r ) .
P r oposition 2 W ith price competition and horizontally di®erentiated prod-
ucts a technology spillover extends the parameter space for which acquisition
is the optimal entry mode.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
H e n c e , wit h p r ic e c o m p e t it io n a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r r e s u lt s in m o r e a c qu i-
s it io n s c o m p a r e d t o a s it u a t io n wit h o u t s p illo ve r s . S in c e t h e e ®e c t o n t h e
g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r MN E d o m in a t e s , t h e im p a c t o n t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e
is fa ir ly o b vio u s . Mo r e fo r m a lly, wit h p r ic e c o m p e t it io n a n d h o r iz o n t a lly
d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t s c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n c o n d it io n ( 2 ) .
Th e r e fo r e , it is e xa c t ly t h e o p p o s it e r e s u lt t h a n wit h qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n .
Th u s , t h e o ve r a ll e ®e c t o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y
m o d e c r u c ia lly d e p e n d s o n t h e n a t u r e o f c o m p e t it io n . Th e o p p o s in g e ®e c t s
o f a s p illo ve r a r e c a u s e d b y t h e fa c t t h a t p r o d u c t s a r e e it h e r s t r a t e g ic s u b -
s t it u t e s o r s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t s . A t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r h a s b a s ic a lly t wo
e ®e c t s : A d ir e c t cost reducing e®ect fo r H C a n d in d ir e c t competition e®ects
o n b o t h ¯ r m s . W it h qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n p r o d u c t s a r e s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t e s .
A s a c o n s e qu e n c e o f t h is t h e t wo e ®e c t s o n t h e p r o ¯ t o f H C r e in fo r c e a n d
d o m in a t e t h e c o m p e t it io n e ®e c t o n MN E . U n d e r p r ic e c o m p e t it io n a n d h o r i-
z o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t s , p r ic e s a r e s t r a t e g ic c o m p le m e n t s . H e n c e , t h e
c o m p e t it io n e ®e c t o f a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e p r o ¯ t fo r MN E d o m in a t e s .
16See Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
1 04 E ntr y M ode Choice when the H ost Coun-
tr y Fir m has P r ivate I nfor mation about P o-
tential T echnology Spillover s
S u p p o s e t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m h a s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n c o n c e r n in g t h e p o t e n t ia l
t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . Th e h o s t c o u n t r y ¯ r m is like ly t o kn o w wh e t h e r it s
wo r ke r s o r m a n a g e r s will b e c a p a b le o f le a r n in g a n d a p p lyin g n e w t e c h n o lo -
g ie s o r kn o w h o w. Th e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m d o e s n o t kn o w wh e t h e r a s p illo ve r
will o c c u r in c a s e o f a g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t b u t b e lie ve s t h a t ¯ r m 1 's p r o -
d u c t io n c o s t will b e c1 o r ¹c1 wit h p r o b a b ilit ie s q a n d ( 1 ¡ q) r e s p e c t ive ly. If
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is c h o s e n , in fo r m a t io n is r e ve a le d . Th e r e fo r e , we t h e n
o b t a in t h e s t a n d a r d r e s u lt s o f t h e d u o p o ly g a m e .
In c a s e o f a c qu is it io n t h e r e is a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e p o t e n -
t ia l s p illo ve r . Th e u n in fo r m e d m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m m a ke s a t a ke -it -o r -le a ve -it
o ®e r a n d b e c o m e s a m o n o p o lis t in t h is m a r ke t if t h e o ®e r is a c c e p t e d . Th e
d o m e s t ic ¯ r m 1 a c c e p t s a n y o ®e r wh ic h g ive s a t le a s t t h e p r o ¯ t t h a t c a n b e
a c h ie ve d in c o m p e t it io n if g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t wo u ld t a ke p la c e . If t h e d o -
m e s t ic ¯ r m r e je c t s t h e o ®e r , MN E e n t e r s via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t a n d ¯ r m s
c o m p e t e in qu a n t it ie s u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n . W e o b t a in t h e fo llo win g r e s u lt
c o n c e r n in g t h e e qu ilib r iu m a c qu is it io n o ®e r :17
Lemma 1 The equilibrium acquisition o®er is
(a) PA = ¼1 if condition (2) is ful¯lled and q ¸ ^q,
(b) PA = ¹¼1 if condition (2) is ful¯lled and q < ^q,
or if only condition (1) is ful¯lled,





P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
17Lemma 5, in the Appendix, determines the equilibrium acquisition o®er if ¯rms com-
pete in prices.
1 1In t u it ive ly, if a c qu is it io n is a lwa ys e ± c ie n t u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n , i.e . c o n -
d it io n ( 2 ) is m e t , a n d t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r is h ig h , i.e . q ¸ ^q, t h e
u n in fo r m e d m u lt in a t io n a l m a ke s a h ig h o ®e r PA = ¼1 wh ic h is a lwa ys a c -
c e p t e d . In t h is c a s e t h e p o t e n t ia l lo s s o f m a kin g a t o o h ig h o ®e r in c a s e t h e r e
is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r is o u t we ig h e d b y t h e b e n e ¯ t s o f b e c o m in g a
m o n o p o lis t ( a n d a vo id in g t h e s p illo ve r ) wh e n a c t u a lly a s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve
o c c u r e d . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , if t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r is s m a ll, i.e .
q < ^q, it is in a s e n s e t o o c o s t ly t o o ®e r a h ig h a c qu is it io n p r ic e . Th e r e fo r e ,
t h e m u lt in a t io n a l m a ke s a lo w o ®e r PA = ¹¼1. Mo r e o ve r , if a n a c qu is it io n is
e ± c ie n t if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s b u t in e ± c ie n t in c a s e o f a s p illo ve r [i.e . c o n -
d it io n ( 1 ) m e t b u t ( 2 ) vio la t e d ] t h e m u lt in a t io n a l a lwa ys m a ke s a lo w o ®e r
PA = ¹¼1. A lo w o ®e r is a c c e p t e d o n ly in c a s e t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a
s p illo ve r a n d o t h e r wis e it 's r e je c t e d . Fin a lly, if a c qu is it io n is n e ve r e ± c ie n t ,
i.e . t h e t e c h n o lo g y d i®e r e n c e is t o o la r g e , t h e m u lt in a t io n a l p r e fe r s n o t t o
m a ke a n o ®e r b u t r a t h e r e n t e r s c o m p e t it io n via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t .
Th e o ve r a ll e ®e c t o f H C's p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o l-
o g y s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y m o d e is t h e fo llo win g .
P r oposition 3 P rivate information for HC about a potential technology spill-
over reduces the parameter space for which acquisition is the optimal entry
mode.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
P r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r H C r e s u lt s in fe we r a c qu is it io n s c o m p a r e d t o fu ll
in fo r m a t io n .18 Th is fo llo ws im m e d ia t e ly fr o m t h e d e t e r m in a t io n o f t h e e qu i-
lib r iu m a c qu is it io n o ®e r . MN E m a ke s a h ig h o ®e r o n ly if a c qu is it io n is e f-
¯ c ie n t a n ywa y. H e n c e , a h ig h o ®e r h a s n o e ®e c t o n t h e o ve r a ll a c qu is it io n
a c t ivit y b u t o n b o t h p a r t ie s ' p a yo ®s . Th is is a ls o t r u e fo r t h e c a s e o f n o
o ®e r , PA = 0 , wh e r e a c qu is it io n is a lwa ys in e ± c ie n t e ve n wit h fu ll in fo r m a -
t io n . If t h e m u lt in a t io n a l m a ke s a lo w o ®e r , PA = ¹¼1, t h is is a c c e p t e d o n ly
if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s . Ot h e r wis e a lo w o ®e r is r e je c t e d . Th is h a s n o e ®e c t
18In the Appendix, we prove that this result is obtained also for the case of price
competition and horizontally di®erentiated products.
1 2o n t h e a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y if o n ly c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d . H o we ve r , t h e
m u lt in a t io n a l s o m e t im e s e n t e r s via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t e ve n t h o u g h wit h
fu ll in fo r m a t io n a c qu is it io n wo u ld b e e ± c ie n t , i.e . if c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is m e t .
W e c a n s u m m a r iz e , p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r H C a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y
s p illo ve r h a s a n e g a t ive e ®e c t o n t h e o ve r a ll a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y.
Fo r a g ive n s p illo ve r , a ft e r t h e a c qu is it io n o ®e r h a s b e e n m a d e a n d e n t r y
t o o k p la c e , t h e qu e s t io n is : wh ic h p a r t y h a s a n a d va n t a g e o r a d is a d va n t a g e
b e c a u s e o f t h e a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n ? It s h o u ld b e e xp e c t e d t h a t t h e
in fo r m e d p a r t y g a in s fr o m h a vin g a n in fo r m a t io n a l a d va n t a g e . B u t a s t h e
fo llo win g r e s u lt s h o ws t h is is n o t a lwa ys t h e c a s e :
P r oposition 4 Compared to full information HC gains from private infor-
mation if condition (2) is ful¯lled and q ¸ ^q, if there is no potential for a
spillover.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
Th e in t u it io n fo r t h is r e s u lt is p r e t t y s t r a ig h t fo r wa r d . H C c a n t a ke a d va n -
t a g e fr o m p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n ly if MN E o ®e r s m o r e t h a n t h e a c t u a l p o s t
g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t . Th is h a p p e n s if t h e m u lt in a t io n a l e xp e c t s a s p illo ve r t o
o c c u r wit h a h ig h p r o b a b ilit y a n d t h e r e fo r e m a ke s a h ig h o ®e r , b u t t h e r e
is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r , i.e . a s p illo ve r wo u ld n o t h a ve o c c u r e d . A s
L e m m a 1 s h o ws , a h ig h o ®e r is o n ly m a d e if a c qu is it io n is e ± c ie n t in a n y
c a s e , i.e . ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d . Th e r e fo r e , t h e t e c h n o lo g ic a l d i®e r e n c e a n d / o r t h e
p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s h o u ld n o t b e t o o la r g e . In a ll o t h e r s it u a t io n s
H C r e c e ive s a p a yo ® wh ic h is e qu a l t o it s p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld e n t r y p r o ¯ t .
Co n s id e r in g t h e s it u a t io n fo r t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m we ¯ n d t h a t t h e MN E
a lwa ys lo s e s c o m p a r e d t o fu ll in fo r m a t io n if H C g a in s . Fu r t h e r m o r e , t h e
m u lt in a t io n a l s o m e t im e s fo r g o e s a n e ± c ie n t a c qu is it io n if a s p illo ve r is e x-
p e c t e d t o b e n o t ve r y like ly b u t it a c t u a lly o c c u r s .
P r oposition 5 Compared to full information M NE su®ers from private in-
formation for HC if condition (2) is ful¯lled and q < ^q (q ¸ ^q), if there is
(no) potential for a spillover.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
1 3A c qu is it io n is e ± c ie n t in a n y c a s e a n d t h u s c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d o n ly if
t h e d i®e r e n c e in t e c h n o lo g ie s a n d / o r t h e t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r is s u ± c ie n t ly
s m a ll. Ot h e r wis e , if t h e t e c h n o lo g y d i®e r e n c e o r t h e s p illo ve r is t o o la r g e ,
t h e m o n o p o ly p r o ¯ t is t o o s m a ll r e la t ive t o t h e s u m o f t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e
a n d t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r MN E . Th u s , p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r H C a b o u t
t h e p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r m a y h a ve a n e ®e c t o n p a yo ®s o n ly if t h e
t e c h n o lo g ic a l d i®e r e n c e a n d t h e r e fo r e t h e p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r is n o t t o o la r g e .
Co m p a r e d t o t h e fu ll in fo r m a t io n c a s e MN E s o m e t im e s m a ke s a n o ®e r wh ic h
is t o o h ig h g ive n t h a t n o s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve o c c u r e d . Or MN E s o m e t im e s
m a ke s a n o ®e r wh ic h is t o o lo w g ive n t h a t a s p illo ve r a c t u a lly o c c u r s . In t h e
fo r m e r c a s e t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m g a in s fr o m it s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n , wh ile in t h e
la t t e r c a s e it m a ke s n o d i®e r e n c e t o H C.
5 E ntr y M ode Choice when the M ultinational
E nter pr ise has P r ivate I nfor mation about
P otential T echnology Spillover s
N o w s u p p o s e t h a t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e h a s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t
t h e p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . MN E m ig h t , fo r e xa m p le , kn o w wh e t h e r
lo c a l wo r ke r s a r e g o in g t o g e t in c o n t a c t wit h s e n s ib le in fo r m a t io n c o n c e r n in g
t h e p r o d u c t io n t e c h n o lo g y t h a t m ig h t b e o f va lu e t o t h e d o m e s t ic c o m p e t it o r .
Th e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m d o e s n o t kn o w wh e t h e r a s p illo ve r will o c c u r in c a s e o f a
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t , b u t b e lie ve s t h a t it s p r o d u c t io n c o s t will b e c1 o r ¹c1
wit h p r o b a b ilit ie s q a n d ( 1 ¡q) r e s p e c t ive ly. A g a in , if g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is
c h o s e n , in fo r m a t io n is r e ve a le d a n d b o t h p a r t ie s c o m p e t e in qu a n t it ie s u n d e r
fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
Th e in fo r m e d m u lt in a t io n a l m a ke s a t a ke -it -o r -le a ve -it o ®e r . B y c h o o s in g
a n a p p r o p r ia t e o ®e r t h e MN E m a y s ig n a l wh e t h e r t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a
s p illo ve r . In a p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m in fo r m a t io n is n o t r e ve a le d b y t h e o ®e r . In
t h is c a s e t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m a c c e p t s a n y o ®e r wh ic h g ive s a t le a s t t h e e xp e c t e d
p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld e n t r y p r o ¯ t , i.e . E[¼1] = q¼1 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼1. In a s e p a r a t in g
1 4e qu ilib r iu m in fo r m a t io n is r e ve a le d a n d t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m c a n d is t in g u is h
b e t we e n b o t h t yp e s o f MN E , i.e wit h o r wit h o u t p o t e n t ia l fo r a t e c h n o lo g y
s p illo ve r . In t h is c a s e t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m a c c e p t s a n y o ®e r wh ic h g ive s a t le a s t
t h e r e s p e c t ive p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t . A g a in , if t h e o ®e r is r e je c t e d o r if n o
o ®e r is m a d e , MN E e n t e r s via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t a n d ¯ r m s c o m p e t e in
qu a n t it ie s u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n . Th e fo llo win g r e s u lt is o b t a in e d :
Lemma 2 There exist three possible equilibria for the acquisition o®er.
1. If ¼M
1 ¸ E[¼1] + ¹¼2 there exists a pooling equilibrium where M NE
o®ers PA = E[¼1], and this o®er is accepted in equilibrium.
2. If ¼1 + ¹¼2 > ¼M
1 ¸ ¼1 + ¼2 there exists a separ ating equilibrium,
where M NE makes a high o®er, PA = ¼1, only if there is potential for
a spillover. This o®er is accepted in equilibrium. Otherwise no o®er is
made.
3. If ¼1 + ¼2 > ¼M
1 there exists a pooling equilibrium where no o®er is
made.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
Th e in t u it io n fo r t h is r e s u lt is t h e fo llo win g . In p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. in -
fo r m a t io n is n o t r e ve a le d s in c e MN E m a ke s t h e s a m e o ®e r , PA = E[¼1],
in d e p e n d e n t ly o f wh e t h e r t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r o r n o t . Th is o c -
c u r s in e qu ilib r iu m if it is p r o ¯ t a b le fo r b o t h t yp e s o f MN E t o m a ke s u c h a n
o ®e r .19 If t h e m u lt in a t io n a l g a in s fr o m s u c h a n o ®e r o n ly if t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l
fo r a s p illo ve r , in fo r m a t io n is r e ve a le d in s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. S in c e t h e n
H C c a n d is t in g u is h t h e t yp e s o f MN E it will o n ly a c c e p t a n o ®e r PA ¸ ¼1 if
t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r . Th e r e fo r e , t h e e qu ilib r iu m o ®e r is r a is e d t o
19Typically signalling games have many equilibria. In our case the problem is that
several o®ers can be supported as a pooling equilibrium with di®erent sets of beliefs. To
be more precise, any o®er PA 2 (E[¼1];¼1) can be supported as a pooling equilibrium. In
these equilibria acquisition is more expensive and therefore the parameter space for which
the respective equilibrium exists is more restricted compared to the one considered here.
Thus, in a sense PA = E[¼1] constitutes a lower bound for the acquisition price.
1 5PA = ¼1 if t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r a n d o t h e r wis e t h e MN E m a ke s
n o o ®e r . Fin a lly, in p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. a c qu is it io n is n o t p r o ¯ t a b le fo r
e it h e r t yp e o f MN E . N o t e t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d e qu ilib r ia m ig h t e xis t a t t h e
s a m e t im e . Mo r e p r e c is e ly fo r c e r t a in p a r a m e t e r c o n s t e lla t io n s t h e p o o lin g
e qu ilib r iu m 1. a n d t h e s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. o r b o t h p o o lin g e qu ilib -
r ia e xis t s im u lt a n e o u s ly.20 Th e s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. a n d t h e p o o lin g
e qu ilib r iu m 3. a r e m u t u a lly e xc lu s ive .
H o w is t h e a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y a ®e c t e d b y p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E
a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r ? Fr o m in s p e c t io n o f t h e e qu ilib r iu m
a c qu is it io n o ®e r s it fo llo ws t h a t fo r c e r t a in p a r a m e t e r c o n s t e lla t io n s a n a c -
qu is it io n , wh ic h u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n wo u ld h a ve b e e n e ± c ie n t , n o t t a ke s
p la c e . Th is h a p p e n s wh e n e ve r t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m m a ke s n o o ®e r b u t ( 1 )
is fu l¯ lle d a n d a s p illo ve r o c c u r s . H o we ve r , a s t h e fo llo win g r e s u lt c la im s , u n -
d e r c e r t a in c o n d it io n s a c qu is it io n is c h o s e n e ve n t h o u g h wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n
t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m wo u ld h a ve c h o s e n g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t :
P r oposition 6 If condition (2) is not ful¯lled, private information for M NE
about a potential technology spillover extends the parameter space for which
acquisition is the optimal entry mode compared to full information in case of
pooling equilibrium 1., i.e. PA = E[¼1].
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
Th e in t u it io n fo r t h is r e s u lt is s t r a ig h t fo r wa r d . If ( 2 ) is n o t fu l¯ lle d t h e
MN E c h o o s e s g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n if a s p illo ve r o c c u r s
s im p ly b e c a u s e a c qu is it io n wo u ld h a ve b e e n t o o e xp e n s ive . W it h p r iva t e
in fo r m a t io n MN E o ®e r s a c h e a p e r a c qu is it io n p r ic e , PA = E[¼1], in p o o lin g
e qu ilib r iu m 1. a n d t h is is a lwa ys a c c e p t e d . Th u s , a c qu is it io n is c h o s e n e ve n
if o t h e r wis e a s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve o c c u r e d . N o t e , h o we ve r , t h a t t h is r e s u lt
h o ld s o n ly if t h is e qu ilib r iu m is s e le c t e d s in c e fo r t h e r e le va n t p a r a m e t e r
c o n s t e lla t io n t h e p o o lin g e qu ilib r ia 1. a n d 3. c o e xis t .
To s u m m a r iz e , we ¯ n d t h a t u n d e r c e r t a in c o n d it io n s t h e a c qu is it io n a c -
t ivit y is e n h a n c e d b y p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E . A s a lr e a d y m e n t io n e d , o n
20See Proof of Lemma 2 for a formal description.
1 6t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n s o m e t im e s p r e ve n t s e ± c ie n t a c qu is it io n s .
D e s p it e o f t h e o p p o s in g e ®e c t s t h e o ve r a ll e ®e c t o f MN E 's p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n
a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y m o d e is u n a m b ig u o u s .
P r oposition 7 P rivate information for M NE about a potential technology
spillover reduces the parameter space for which acquisition is the optimal
entry mode.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
Th u s , p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E r e s u lt s in fe we r a c qu is it io n s c o m p a r e d t o
fu ll in fo r m a t io n .21 Th e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e s o m e t im e s m a ke s n o a c qu i-
s it io n o ®e r a t a ll e ve n t h o u g h t h is wo u ld b e e ± c ie n t u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
W it h fu ll in fo r m a t io n a c qu is it io n is e ± c ie n t if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s a n d ( 1 ) is
m e t . In t h e s a m e s it u a t io n b u t wit h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E n o o ®e r
is c h o s e n in c a s e o f s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. o r p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. Th e
p o s it ive e ®e c t o f p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y wh ic h wa s s t a t e d
in P r o p o s it io n 6 is m o r e t h a n c o m p e n s a t e d b y t h e s e t wo n e g a t ive e ®e c t s .22
W h ic h o f t h e p a r t ie s g a in s a n d wh ic h s u ®e r s fr o m p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r
MN E a b o u t a p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r fo r a g ive n s p illo ve r ? A g a in , it
c o u ld b e e xp e c t e d t h a t t h e in fo r m e d p a r t y c a n t a ke a d va n t a g e o f it s in fo r -
m a t io n . H o we ve r , t h is m u s t n o t b e in g e n e r a l t h e c a s e . In fa c t it c a n b e
e xa c t ly t h e o p p o s it e wa y wit h t h e u n in fo r m e d H C g a in in g fr o m a s ym m e t r ic
in fo r m a t io n . Th e r e a s o n fo r t h is r e s u lt is t h a t MN E s o m e t im e s o ®e r s m o r e
t h a n t h e a c t u a l p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t t o a c qu ir e H C.
P r oposition 8 Compared to full information HC (gains) su®ers from pri-
vate information for M NE in pooling equilibrium 1., i.e. PA = E[¼1], if there
is (no) potential for a spillover.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
21Again, this result is independent of the form of competition as shown in the Appendix.
22Furthermore, the problem of equilibrium selection should be remembered. The result
of Proposition 7 is straightforward if instead of pooling equilibrium 1. with PA = E[¼1]
pooling equilibrium 3. with PA = 0 is considered in the respective parameter space.
1 7Th e a c qu is it io n p r ic e PA = E[¼1] is t o o lo w c o m p a r e d t o fu ll in fo r m a t io n if a
s p illo ve r o c c u r s b u t it is t o o h ig h g ive n t h a t n o s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve o c c u r e d .
In a ll o t h e r s it u a t io n s H C r e c e ive s a p a yo ® wh ic h is e qu a l t o it s p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld
p r o ¯ t wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n in d e p e n d e n t ly o f wh e t h e r g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t
o r a c qu is it io n t a ke s p la c e .
Fo r t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m it is e xa c t ly t h e o t h e r wa y r o u n d wh e n t h e
e qu ilib r iu m a c qu is it io n o ®e r is e qu a l t o PA = E[¼1]. Th u s , MN E m ig h t
g a in o r s u ®e r fr o m h a vin g p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n . B u t t h e r e a r e a d d it io n a l
d is a d va n t a g e s :
P r oposition 9 Compared to full information
(a) M NE gains (su®ers) from private information in pooling equilibrium
1., i.e. PA = E[¼1], if there is (no) potential for a spillover, or
(b) M NE su®ers from private information if condition (1) is ful¯lled, if
there is no potential for a spillover.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
Th e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m t a ke s a d va n t a g e o f it s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n ly if in
p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. a s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve o c c u r e d . Ot h e r wis e MN E h a s
a d is a d va n t a g e in p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. Mo r e o ve r , in a ll o t h e r c a s e s , if
t e c h n o lo g ie s a r e s u ± c ie n t ly s im ila r , i.e . ( 1 ) fu l¯ lle d , a n d t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l
fo r a s p illo ve r , MN E c h o o s e s g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t e ve n t h o u g h a c qu is it io n
wo u ld h a ve b e e n e ± c ie n t . H e n c e , t h e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e s t h e n s u ®e r s
fr o m it s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n t o o . In a ll o t h e r s it u a t io n s t h e MN E a c h ie ve s
t h e s a m e p a yo ® a s wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
A g a in , p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E a b o u t t h e p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r m a y
h a ve a n e ®e c t o n p a yo ®s o n ly if t h e t e c h n o lo g ic a l d i®e r e n c e is s u ± c ie n t ly
s m a ll. H o we ve r , t h is is a b it d i®e r e n t fr o m t h e s it u a t io n wit h p r iva t e in fo r -
m a t io n fo r H C a b o u t t h e p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r . In s o m e s e n s e t h e c ir c u m s t a n c e s
fo r wh ic h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n m a y h a ve a n e ®e c t o n p a yo ®s a r e m o r e lim it e d
if H C is p r iva t e ly in fo r m e d t h a n if MN E is p r iva t e ly in fo r m e d . In t h e fo r m e r
s it u a t io n a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n m a y h a ve a n e ®e c t o n ly fo r ve r y s im ila r
1 8t e c h n o lo g ie s ( i.e . c o n d it io n ( 2 ) fu l¯ lle d ) . In t h e la t t e r it m a y h a ve a n e ®e c t
a ls o fo r n o t t o o s im ila r t e c h n o lo g ie s ( i.e . c o n d it io n ( 1 ) fu l¯ lle d ) .
6 Compar ison of the Di®er ent I nfor mational
Scenar ios fr om an E x Ante P er spective
In t h is s e c t io n , we c o m p a r e t h e d i®e r e n t in fo r m a t io n a l s c e n a r io s fr o m a n e x
a n t e p e r s p e c t ive . Th is e n a b le s u s t o ju d g e wh ic h o f t h e d e s c r ib e d s it u a t io n s
s h o u ld b e in t h e in t e r e s t o f t h e p a r t ie s if t h e y we r e a b le t o c h o o s e b e t we e n
b e in g in fo r m e d o r u n in fo r m e d in t h e ¯ r s t p la c e , i.e . b e fo r e a n y o t h e r d e c is io n s
a r e d e t e r m in e d . A p r io r i o n e m ig h t e xp e c t t h a t it is a lwa ys in t h e in t e r e s t o f
e it h e r p a r t y t o h a ve p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n t h e p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r .
A t le a s t fr o m a n e x a n t e p e r s p e c t ive p a r t ie s s h o u ld b e a b le t o t a ke a d va n t a g e
fr o m b e in g p r iva t e ly in fo r m e d , e ve n t h o u g h e x p o s t t h is m u s t n o t b e t h e c a s e
in g e n e r a l a s we h a ve a lr e a d y s h o wn . H o we ve r , t h e fo llo win g r e s u lt s t a t e s
t h a t t h is is n o t t h e c a s e fo r t h e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e .
P r oposition 10 E x ante M NE always (weakly) prefers full information over
any kind of asymmetric information.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
Th is is p a r t ic u la r ly s u r p r is in g g ive n t h e fa c t t h a t t h e MN E p r o p o s e s t h e a c -
qu is it io n o ®e r a n d m ig h t t h e r e b y fu r t h e r e xp lo it a n in fo r m a t io n a l a d va n t a g e .
W h a t is t h e r e a s o n fo r t h is r e s u lt ? In t u it ive ly, we c a n s t a t e t h a t s ig n a llin g
it s t yp e is t o o c o s t ly fo r MN E in s o m e s e n s e fr o m a n e x a n t e p e r s p e c t ive .
In o r d e r t o b e a b le t o s e p a r a t e t h e s p illo ve r in d u c in g t yp e fr o m t h e o n e t h a t
h a s n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r , MN E m u s t r e fr a in fr o m a n n o u n c in g a p o s i-
t ive a c qu is it io n o ®e r if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s e ve n t h o u g h t h is wo u ld b e e ± c ie n t .
Mo r e o ve r , MN E c a n n o t s e p a r a t e in c a s e a n a c qu is it io n wo u ld o n ly b e e ± c ie n t
if t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r s in c e a n y p o s it ive o ®e r c a n b e p r o ¯ t a b ly
r e p lic a t e d b y t h e s p illo ve r in d u c in g t yp e . To s u m m a r iz e , we c a n c o n c lu d e
t h a t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l e n t e r p r is e s o m e t im e s m u s t fo r g o e ± c ie n t a c qu is it io n s
1 9a n d is t h e r e fo r e n o t a b le t o t a ke a d va n t a g e o f it s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n . Ob vi-
o u s ly, p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r H C a b o u t t h e t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r c a n n o t b e
in t h e in t e r e s t o f MN E .
W it h r e s p e c t t o t h e h o s t c o u n t r y ¯ r m we o b t a in t h e m o r e s t r a ig h t fo r wa r d
r e s u lt t h a t p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n is p r e fe r e d fr o m a n e x a n t e a s we ll a s fr o m a n
e x p o s t p e r s p e c t ive .
P r oposition 11 E x ante HC always (weakly) prefers to have private infor-
mations.
P r oof: S e e A p p e n d ix.
In t u it ive ly, t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m c a n t a ke a d va n t a g e o f p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n s in c e
t h e r e is n o s ig n a llin g c o s t in vo lve d . S o m e kin d o f s ig n a llin g a n d in fo r m a t io n
r e ve a lin g t a ke s p la c e b y r e je c t io n o f a n o ®e r , wh ic h will o n ly h a p p e n in c a s e
t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r b u t a lo w o ®e r is m a d e .
Ob vio u s ly, t h e r e is a d i®e r e n c e b e t we e n t h e e x a n t e a n d t h e e x p o s t p r e f-
e r e n c e t o wa r d s t h e in fo r m a t io n a l s it u a t io n . Th is is n o t ve r y s u r p r is in g s in c e a
d ive r g e n c e in e x a n t e a n d e x p o s t c o n s id e r a t io n s is a c o m m o n fe a t u r e o f m a n y
e c o n o m ic is s u e s . W h a t is s u r p r is in g is t h e fa c t t h a t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m
wo u ld n o t c h o o s e t o h a ve p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y
s p illo ve r in t h e ¯ r s t p la c e . In s o m e s e n s e MN E h a s t h e d is a d va n t a g e o f h a vin g
t o m a ke a n a c qu is it io n o ®e r in b o t h s c e n a r io s o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n .
7 Discussion and Conclusions
In t h e e xis t in g lit e r a t u r e o n FD I t h e r e is n o we ll d e ve lo p e d t h e o r y o f t h e
d e t e r m in a n t s o f t h e c h o ic e b e t we e n g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t a n d a c qu is it io n s .
N e ve r t h e le s s , it is we ll r e c o g n iz e d t h a t t h is is s u e is ve r y im p o r t a n t b o t h
fr o m a h o s t c o u n t r y p e r s p e c t ive a n d fr o m t h e p e r s p e c t ive o f a m u lt in a t io n a l
e n t e r p r is e . A s e m p ir ic a l e vid e n c e s u g g e s t s , t h e s t r a t e g ic e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e is
a ®e c t e d b y va r io u s ¯ r m s p e c i¯ c a n d c o u n t r y s p e c i¯ c fa c t o r s . A m o n g o t h e r s
t h e p o t e n t ia l fo r t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s s e e m s t o p la y a n im p o r t a n t r o le . W e
c o n t r ib u t e t o t h e lit e r a t u r e b y p r o vid in g a s im p le t h e o r e t ic a l m o d e l t o a n a lyz e
2 0t h e e ®e c t s o f t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s o n t h e c h o ic e o f e n t r y m o d e . In p a r t ic u la r ,
we e xa m in e d t h e e ®e c t o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e p o t e n t ia l fo r a
s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y d e c is io n .
Fir s t , we s h o we d t h a t u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n t h e o ve r a ll e ®e c t o f a p o -
t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r c r u c ia lly d e p e n d s o n t h e n a t u r e o f c o m p e t it io n .
W it h qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r r e s u lt s in fe we r a c qu is i-
t io n s . W it h p r ic e c o m p e t it io n a n d h o r iz o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t s a
s p illo ve r h a s e xa c t ly t h e o p p o s it e e ®e c t . Th e s e s c o n t r a r y e ®e c t s a r e c a u s e d
b y t h e fa c t t h a t p r o d u c t s a r e e it h e r s t r a t e g ic s u b s t it u t e s o r s t r a t e g ic c o m p le -
m e n t s u n d e r t h e t wo fo r m s o f c o m p e t it io n .
P r e vio u s wo r k e m p h a s iz e d t h a t a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n m a y b e a h in -
d r a n c e t o t h e fo r m a t io n o f m e r g e r s . In c o n t r a s t , o u r a p p r o a c h a n a lyz e s it s
e ®e c t s o n b o t h a lt e r n a t ive m o d e s o f fo r e ig n e n t r y. Fo r t h e t wo s c e n a r io s o f
a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n we a ls o ¯ n d t h a t t h is h a s a n e g a t ive e ®e c t o n t h e
o ve r a ll a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y. Th e r e a s o n fo r t h is is t h a t t h e m u lt in a t io n a l
e n t e r p r is e s o m e t im e s m u s t fo r g o o r fo r g o e s o t h e r wis e e ± c ie n t a c qu is it io n s .
Fu r t h e r m o r e , t h is r e s u lt is in d e p e n d e n t o f t h e n a t u r e o f c o m p e t it io n . E ve n
t h o u g h t h e o ve r a ll e ®e c t is u n a m b ig u o u s , we ¯ n d t h a t u n d e r c e r t a in c o n d i-
t io n s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E r e s u lt s in a c qu is it io n s wh ic h wo u ld n o t
h a ve t a ke n p la c e u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
Fin a lly, we p r o ve d t h a t t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m is a lwa ys b e t t e r o ® wh e n b e in g
p r iva t e ly in fo r m e d . In t e r e s t in g ly, h o we ve r , t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m wo u ld e x
a n t e p r e fe r fu ll in fo r m a t io n r a t h e r t h a n p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t t h e p o t e n -
t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r . W it h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n t h e MN E s o m e t im e s m u s t fo r g o
e ± c ie n t a c qu is it io n s a n d a ls o s o m e t im e s c h o o s e s in e ± c ie n t a c qu is it io n s .
Th e r e s u lt s o f o u r t h e o r e t ic a l m o d e l a r e c o n s is t e n t wit h e m p ir ic a l e vid e n c e
o n fo r e ig n m a r ke t e n t r y. R &D in t e n s ive ¯ r m s r a t h e r p r e fe r t o e n t e r a fo r e ig n
m a r ke t via g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t ( Ca ve s a n d Me h r a [1 9 8 6 ], Me ye r [1 9 9 8 ]) .
Mo r e o ve r , in ve s t o r s wit h we a k c o m p e t it ive a d va n t a g e s u s e a c qu is it io n s , wh ile
in ve s t o r s wit h s t r o n g a d va n t a g e s ¯ n d g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t t o b e t h e m o r e
e ± c ie n t e n t r y m o d e .23 Ou r t h e o r e t ic a l r e s u lt s c o n ¯ r m t h a t a c qu is it io n s h o u ld
23See Hennart and Park [1993] and Andersson and Svensson [1994].
2 1b e t h e p r e fe r e d m o d e o f e n t r y if t h e t e c h n o lo g y d i®e r e n c e is n o t t o o la r g e a n d
o t h e r wis e g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is m o r e e ± c ie n t . S p illo ve r s m a y o n ly o c c u r
if t h e r e e xis t s a c e r t a in t e c h n o lo g y g a p . H o we ve r , t h e r e is e vid e n c e t h a t
s p illo ve r s a r e m o r e like ly g e n e r a t e d if t h e t e c h n o lo g y g a p is n o t t o o la r g e
( X u [2 0 0 0 ]) .24 In o u r m o d e l, a s p illo ve r c a n o c c u r ( if a t a ll) o n ly in c a s e o f
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t . Gr e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t t a ke s p la c e e it h e r u n d e r c e r t a in
c o n d it io n s fo r a n in t e r m e d ia t e t e c h n o lo g y d i®e r e n c e o r if t h e m u lt in a t io n a l
¯ r m p o s s e s s e s a ve r y s u p e r io r t e c h n o lo g y. Fo r a n in t e r m e d ia t e t e c h n o lo g ic a l
d i®e r e n c e o u r r e s u lt s e xa c t ly in d ic a t e t h a t g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is c h o s e n
wh e n e ve r t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r is s u ± c ie n t ly h ig h . Th is in t u r n
c a n le a d t o a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r . Co n c e r n in g t h e c a s e o f a ve r y s u p e r io r
t e c h n o lo g y, we wo u ld a r g u e t h a t wh e t h e r in r e a lit y a s p illo ve r o c c u r s a g a in
d e p e n d s ve r y m u c h o n t h e a b s o r p t ive c a p a c it y o f t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m . Of c o u r s e
in o u r m o d e l t h is h a s n o e ®e c t o n t h e e n t r y m o d e c h o ic e s in c e fo r a la r g e
t e c h n o lo g y g a p t h e MN E a lwa ys p r e fe r s g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t .
A n e xt e n s io n o f t h e m o d e l c o u ld in c lu d e t h e a n a lys is o f t h e c h o ic e o f
e n t r y m o d e wh e n t h e r e a r e m o r e p o t e n t ia l t a r g e t s fo r a c qu is it io n in t h e m a r -
ke t . In t h is c a s e it is we ll kn o wn t h a t t h e s c o p e fo r a p r o ¯ t a b le m e r g e r is
lim it e d .25 Mo r e o ve r , it t h e n wo u ld b e n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m in e e xa c t ly u n d e r
wh ic h c ir c u m s t a n c e s a s p illo ve r o c c u r s a n d wh e t h e r it b e n e ¯ t s a ll c o m p a n ie s
in t h e r e s p e c t ive m a r ke t . Th e s e a n d o t h e r c o n s id e r a t io n s a r e le ft fo r fu t u r e
r e s e a r c h .
24The stock of human capital limits the absorptive capacity of a developing country, as
already emphasized in Nelson and Phelps [1966] and empirically tested by Benhabib and
Spiegel [1994].
25See, for example, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds [1983], Levin [1990], Kamien and Zang
[1990] or Gilbert and Newbery [1992] for theoretical discussions.
2 2Appendix
A) T he e®ect of a technology spillover on the gr een¯eld pr o¯t and
on the acquisition pr ice
Lemma 3 W ith quantity competition a technology spillover, i.e. a decrease
in c1, always results in a decrease in ¼2, while PA increases.
P r o o f:
W it h a s ym m e t r ic c o s t s t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r t h e MN E a n d t h e a c qu is it io n
p r ic e a r e
¼2 =
( a ¡ 2 c2 + c1) 2
9
;PA =
( a ¡ 2 c1 + c2) 2
9
:










4 ( a ¡ 2 c1 + c2)
9
< 0 ;






















¯ , 5 c1 ¡ 4 c2
¸
< a:
Th e r e fo r e , t h e e ®e c t o f a m a r g in a l r e d u c t io n in c1, i.e . a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r ,
o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t o f MN E d o m in a t e s o n ly if t h e d i®e r e n c e in t e c h n o lo -
g ie s is s u ± c ie n t ly la r g e .
Q.E .D .
Lemma 4 W ith price competition and horizontally di®erentiated products a
technology spillover, i.e. a decrease in c1, always results in a decrease in ¼2,
while PA (weakly) increases.
2 3P r o o f:
Co n s id e r a s t a n d a r d m o d e l o f h o r iz o n t a l p r o d u c t d i®e r e n t ia t io n wit h ¯ r m s
c o m p e t in g in p r ic e s . Co n s u m e r s a r e a s s u m e d t o b e u n ifo r m ly d is t r ib u t e d
a lo n g t h e u n it in t e r va l [0 ,1 ] wit h d e n s it y 1 . H C is lo c a t e d a t x = 0 a n d MN E
c a n c h o o s e b e t we e n a c qu is it io n o f H C o r a g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t wit h k = 0
in lo c a t io n x = 1 . Co n s u m e r s r e c e ive t h e s u r p lu s s fr o m c o n s u m p t io n b u t
t h e y h a ve t o in c u r a t r a n s p o r t a t io n c o s t t wh ic h is lin e a r in t h e d is t a n c e t o
t h e ¯ r m fr o m wh ic h t h e g o o d is b o u g h t . D e p e n d in g o n m a r ke t c h a r a c t e r is t ic s
t h e r e a r e t h r e e s it u a t io n s t h a t h a ve t o b e c o n s id e r e d .26 Th e p r o ¯ t fo r t h e
m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m a n d t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e in t h e s e t h r e e c a s e s a r e :
Case 1: If t < c1¡c2
3 , MN E c a n fo r c e it s c o m p e t it o r o u t o f t h e m a r ke t b y a
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t :
¼2 = c1 ¡ c2 ¡ t; PA = 0 :
Case 2: If t ¸ c1¡c2
3 a n d s ¸ 1
2( c1+c2+3 t) , t h e r e e xis t s a m a r g in a l c o n s u m e r
wit h lo c a t io n ~x wh o is in d i®e r e n t b e t we e n b u yin g fr o m H C o r MN E :
¼2 =
( c1 ¡ c2 + 3 t) 2
1 8 t
; PA =
( c2 ¡ c1 + 3 t) 2
1 8 t
:
Case 3: B o t h ¯ r m s h a ve lo c a l m o n o p o ly p o we r o ve r t h e ir c o n s u m e r s . H e r e ,
t wo m o r e s it u a t io n s h a ve t o b e c o n s id e r e d :
( a ) If t ¸ c1¡c2
3 a n d 1
2( c1 + c2 + 3 t) > s > 1
3( 2 c1 + c2 + 3 t) , p r ic e s a r e c h o s e n
s u c h t h a t t h e m a r g in a l c o n s u m e r a t ~x is in d i®e r e n t b e t we e n t h e ¯ r m s a n d
b e t we e n b u yin g o r n o t :
¼2 =
Ã
6 s ¡ c1 ¡ 5 c2 ¡ 3 t
6
!Ã






6 s ¡ 5 c1 ¡ c2 ¡ 3 t
6
!Ã




( b ) If t ¸ c1¡c2
3 a n d 1
3( 2 c1 + c2 + 3 t) ¸ s, H C c h o o s e s it s m o n o p o ly p r ic e
a n d MN E s e t s a p r ic e s u c h t h a t t h e r e e xis t s a c o n s u m e r wh o is in d i®e r e n t
26See MÄ uller [2001] for a detailed analysis.
2 4b e t we e n t h e ¯ r m s a n d b e t we e n b u yin g o r n o t :
¼2 =
Ã
3 s ¡ c1 ¡ 2 c2 ¡ 2 t
2
!Ã




( s ¡ c1) 2
4 t
:




dc1 = 1 ,
dPA





9t > 0 ,
dPA
dc1 = c1¡c2¡3t
9t · 0 .




18t > 0 ,
dPA
dc1 = 5c1¡2c2¡6t¡3s





2t > 0 ,
dPA
dc1 = ¡s¡c1
2t < 0 .
































¯, fo r c1¡c2
3 · t ·
4(c1¡c2)











¯ ¯, fo r t >
4(c1¡c2)
9 .
Th e r e fo r e , t h e e ®e c t o f a m a r g in a l r e d u c t io n in c1, i.e . a t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r ,
o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t o f MN E a lwa ys d o m in a t e s e xc e p t u n d e r c e r t a in c o n -
d it io n s fo r Case 3 ( a ) .
Q.E .D .
B ) P r oofs
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 1 :
W e s im p ly h a ve t o s h o w t h a t wit h qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is
m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n c o n d it io n ( 1 ) . Th e m o n o p o ly p r o ¯ t wit h t e c h n o lo g y ¹c1




( a ¡ ¹c1) 2
4
:
2 5Th e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t s fo r b o t h p a r t ie s if o r if n o t a s p illo ve r o c c u r s , r e s p e c -
t ive ly, a r e g ive n b y
¼1 =
( a ¡ 2 c1 + c2) 2
9
; ¼2 =




( a ¡ 2 ¹c1 + c2) 2
9
; ¹¼2 =
( a ¡ 2 c2 + ¹c1) 2
9
:
Th u s , c o n d it io n ( 1 ) b e c o m e s
( a ¡ ¹c1) 2
4
¸
( a ¡ 2 ¹c1 + c2) 2
9
+
( a ¡ 2 c2 + ¹c1) 2
9
:
, a ¸ 5 ¹c1 ¡ 4 c2 §
q
( ¹c1 ¡ c2) 2
) a ¸ 1 1 ¹c1 ¡ 1 0 c2: ( 1 0)
( Th e o t h e r s o lu t io n c a n b e n e g le c t e d s in c e b y a s s u m p t io n a ¸ 2 ¹c1 ¡ c2.)
Co n d it io n ( 2 ) b e c o m e s
( a ¡ ¹c1) 2
4
¸
( a ¡ 2 c1 + c2) 2
9
+
( a ¡ 2 c2 + c1) 2
9
, a ¸ 9 ¹c1 ¡ 4 c2 ¡ 4 c1 § 6
q
c2
2 ¡ 2 ¹c1c2 + 2 ¹c2
1 ¡ 2 ¹c1c1 + c2
1:
) a ¸ 9 ¹c1 ¡ 4 c2 ¡ 4 c1 + 6
q
( ¹c1 ¡ c2) 2 + ( ¹c1 ¡ c1) 2: ( 2 0)
( Th e o t h e r s o lu t io n a g a in c a n b e n e g le c t e d ) .
D e ¯ n e ¢ = ¹c1 ¡ c1 > 0 . W h e r e ¢ is t h e p o t e n t ia l s p illo ve r .
Co n d it io n ( 2 0) is m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n c o n d it io n ( 1 0) if
9 ¹c1 ¡ 4 c2 ¡ 4 c1 + 6
q
c2
2 ¡ 2 ¹c1c2 + 2 ¹c2
1 ¡ 2 ¹c1c1 + c2
1 > 1 1 ¹c1 ¡ 1 0 c2
, 1 7 ¹c
2
1 ¡ 1 2 ¹c1c2 ¡ 2 2 ¹c1c1 + 5 c
2
1 + 1 2 c1c2 > 0
, 1 2 ¹c1 ¡ 1 2 c2 + 5 ¢ > 0 :
Th e ¯ n a l in e qu a lit y h o ld s s in c e ¹c1 > c2 a n d ¢ > 0 .
Q.E .D .
2 6P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 2 :
W e h a ve t o s h o w t h a t wit h p r ic e c o m p e t it io n a n d h o r iz o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d
p r o d u c t s c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n c o n d it io n ( 2 ) . Th e m o n o p o ly







s ¡ t ¡ ¹c1 , if s ¸ ¹c1 + 2 t,
(s¡¹ c1)2
4t , o t h e r wis e .
A c qu is it io n is t h e o p t im a l m o d e o f e n t r y if t h e r e s p e c t ive m o n o p o ly p r o ¯ t
e xc e e d s t h e s u m o f t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t fo r MN E a n d o f t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e ,
wh ic h is r e ° e c t e d in c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) . B y P r o o f o f L e m m a 4 we a lr e a d y
kn o w t h a t t h e e ®e c t o f a m a r g in a l r e d u c t io n in c1 o n t h e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t
fo r MN E d o m in a t e s t h e e ®e c t o n t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e in a ll c a s e s e xc e p t
u n d e r c e r t a in c o n d it io n s fo r Case 3 ( a ) . Th e r e fo r e , it is o b vio u s t h a t in a ll
t h e s e o t h e r c a s e s a s p illo ve r r e s u lt s in a c qu is it io n b e c o m in g r e la t ive ly m o r e
a t t r a c t ive , o r , in o t h e r wo r d s , c o n d it io n ( 1 ) b e in g m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n ( 2 ) .
Th e g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t s fo r b o t h p a r t ie s in Case 3 ( a ) if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s a r e
g ive n b y
¹¼1 =
Ã
6 s ¡ 5 ¹c1 ¡ c2 ¡ 3 t
6
!Ã






6 s ¡ ¹c1 ¡ 5 c2 ¡ 3 t
6
!Ã


























( ¹c1 ¡ c2) 2 +
1
2
t( ¹c1 ¡ c2 + t)




( ¹c1 ¡ c2) 2 +
1
2
t( ¹c1 ¡ c2 + t) : ( 1 00)
( Th e o t h e r s o lu t io n c a n b e n e g le c t e d s in c e in Case 3 we h a ve s < ¹c1 + 2 t.)
H o we ve r , c o n d it io n ( 1 00) c a n n e ve r b e fu l¯ lle d b e c a u s e in Case 3 ( a ) we m u s t
h a ve s > 1
3( 2 ¹c1 + c2 + 3 t) :
1
3




( ¹c1 ¡ c2) 2 +
1
2
t( ¹c1 ¡ c2 + t)
2 7, 9 t
2 + 1 2 t¹c1 ¡ 1 2 tc2 > ¡3 ( ¹c1 ¡ c2)
2:
Th e ¯ n a l in e qu a lit y h o ld s s in c e ¹c1 > c2.
Th u s , in o t h e r wo r d s , wit h o u t a s p illo ve r g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is a lwa ys t h e
o p t im a l e n t r y m o d e in Case 3 ( a ) . If, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a s p illo ve r o c c u r s
t h is will a t le a s t n o t r e s u lt in fe we r a c qu is it io n s in d e p e n d e n t ly o f wh e t h e r
c o n d it io n ( 2 ) c a n b e fu l¯ lle d in Case 3 ( a ) . N o t e ¯ n a lly t h a t in Case 3 ( b )
a c qu is it io n will n e ve r t a ke p la c e a n ywa y.
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f L e m m a 1 :
In e qu ilib r iu m MN E will o b vio u s ly n e ve r o ®e r PA > ¼1 s in c e t h e d o m e s t ic
¯ r m a c c e p t s PA = ¼1 a n ywa y. W e c a n a ls o ig n o r e a n y o ®e r 0 < PA < ¹¼1
wh ic h will a lwa ys b e r e je c t e d b y t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m a n d it is p a yo ® e qu iva le n t
t o a n o ®e r PA = 0 . Mo r e o ve r , a n y o ®e r ¹¼1 < PA < ¼1 c a n n o t b e a n e qu ilib -
r iu m o ®e r s in c e t h is wo u ld o n ly b e a c c e p t e d if n o s p illo ve r o c c u r s wh ic h c a n
a ls o b e a c h ie ve d b y o ®e r in g PA = ¹¼1. Th e r e fo r e , t h e m u lt in a t io n a l ¯ r m will
o ®e r PA = ¼1 o r PA = ¹¼1 o r PA = 0 d e p e n d in g o n t h e e ± c ie n c y o f a c qu is it io n
a n d o n t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r .
If ( 2 ) is m e t , a c qu is it io n is e ± c ie n t in d e p e n d e n t ly o f a s p illo ve r . Th e m u lt i-
n a t io n a l p r e fe r s t o o ®e r PA = ¼1 in s t e a d o f PA = ¹¼1 if t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a
s p illo ve r q is h ig h e n o u g h s u c h t h a t t h e g a in fr o m b e c o m in g a m o n o p o lis t
o u t we ig h s t h e lo s s o f a t o o h ig h o ®e r in c a s e n o s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve o c c u r e d :
¼
M






1 ¡ ¹¼1 ¡ ¼2
= ^q:
W h e r e ^q 2 ( 0 ;1 ) s in c e ¼1 > ¹¼1 a n d b y ( 2 ) .
If o n ly c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d a c qu is it io n a t p r ic e PA = ¹¼1 is e ± c ie n t a n d
will b e a c c e p t e d o n ly if t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r . Ot h e r wis e t h is
o ®e r is r e je c t e d . If a c qu is it io n is n e ve r e ± c ie n t PA = 0 is c h o s e n .
Q.E .D .
2 8P r o o f o f L e m m a 2 :
Th e r e a r e t h r e e t yp e s o f p o s s ib le e qu ilib r iu m a c qu is it io n o ®e r s PA wh ic h c a n
b e s u p p o r t e d b y d i®e r e n t s e t s o f b e lie fs fo r d i®e r e n t p a r a m e t e r c o n s t e lla t io n s :
1 . A p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m in wh ic h t h e MN E m a ke s a n o ®e r wh ic h is a lwa ys
a c c e p t e d .
2 . A s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m in wh ic h MN E m a ke s a n o ®e r o n ly if t h e r e is
p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r . Th is o ®e r is a c c e p t e d . Ot h e r wis e MN E m a ke s
n o o ®e r .
3 . A p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m in wh ic h MN E n e ve r m a ke s a n o ®e r in d e p e n -
d e n t ly o f it s t yp e .
P o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1.: Co n s id e r a n a c qu is it io n o ®e r wit h PA = E[¼1], wh e r e
E[¼1] = q¼1 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼1 a n d s u p p o s e t h a t e a c h t yp e o f MN E m a ke s s u c h a n
o ®e r . A c c o r d in g t o B a ye 's r u le t h e u p d a t e d b e lie f o f H C is t h e n ~q = q, i.e .
H C d o e s n o t le a r n a n yt h in g . Fo r t h e o u t -o f-e qu ilib r iu m b e lie f B a ye 's R u le
c a n n o t b e a p p lie d a n d H C is fr e e t o b e lie ve a n yt h in g . H o we ve r , u p d a t in g h a s
t o b e c o n s is t e n t wit h t h e e qu ilib r iu m s t r a t e g ie s . Th e p r o p o s e d e qu ilib r iu m
a c qu is it io n o ®e r c a n b e s u p p o r t e d b y a n o u t -o f-e qu ilib r iu m b e lie f ~q = 1 . S u c h
a n e qu ilib r iu m e xis t s if b o t h t yp e s o f MN E , i.e . wit h o r wit h o u t p o t e n t ia l fo r
a s p illo ve r , g a in fr o m s u c h a n o ®e r :
¼
M
1 ¡ E[¼1] ¸ ¹¼2
, ¼
M
1 ¸ E[¼1] + ¹¼2: ( 3 )
S e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2.: Th e MN E wit h p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r m a ke s a
h ig h o ®e r PA = ¼1, wh ile t h e o t h e r t yp e m a ke s n o o ®e r . Th u s , H C c a n a lwa ys
u p d a t e it s b e lie fs a c c o r d in g t o B a ye 's R u le . Th e r e fo r e , if PA = ¼1 is o b s e r ve d ,
t h e u p d a t e d b e lie f b e c o m e s ~q = 1 a n d o t h e r wis e ~q = 0 . Th e p r o p o s e d
e qu ilib r iu m e xis t s if c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d if it 's n o t wo r t h wh ile fo r t h e
t yp e o f MN E wit h o u t p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r t o im it a t e , i.e . if
¼
M
1 ¡ ¼1 < ¹¼2
2 9, ¹¼2 + ¼1 > ¼
M
1 : ( 4 )
Ob vio u s ly, c o n d it io n s ( 4 ) a n d ( 2 ) c a n b e s im u lt a n e o u s ly fu l¯ lle d s in c e ¹¼2 >
¼2.
Fin a lly, p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. wit h PA = 0 e xis t s if c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is n o t
fu l¯ lle d . In t h is c a s e it is n o t e ± c ie n t fo r a MN E wit h p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r
t o a c qu ir e . Th e t yp e o f MN E wit h o u t a p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r is n o t a b le t o
s e p a r a t e s in c e a n y p o s it ive o ®e r c o u ld b e p r o ¯ t a b ly r e p lic a t e d b y t h e o t h e r
t yp e o f MN E .
Th e p r o p o s e d e qu ilib r ia c a n e xis t a t t h e s a m e t im e . Fo r c e r t a in p a r a m e t e r
c o n s t e lla t io n s t h e p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. a n d t h e s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. o r
b o t h p o o lin g e qu ilib r ia e xis t s im u lt a n e o u s ly. Mo r e p r e c is e ly, c o n d it io n s ( 3 )
a n d ( 4 ) c a n b e fu l¯ lle d a t t h e s a m e t im e a n d t h e r e fo r e e qu ilib r iu m 1. a n d 2.
e xis t s im u lt a n e o u s ly if
¼
M
1 ¡ E[¼1] ¸ ¹¼2 ¸ ¼
M
1 ¡ ¼1:
B o t h p o o lin g e qu ilib r ia m a y c o e xis t s in c e ( 3 ) c a n b e fu l¯ lle d a n d a t t h e s a m e
t im e ( 2 ) c a n b e vio la t e d if
¼
M
1 ¡ E[¼1] ¸ ¹¼2 > ¼2 > ¼
M
1 ¡ ¼1:
In s h o r t , c o e xis t e n c e is o n ly g ive n if ( 3 ) o r ( 4 ) a r e fu l¯ lle d . Ot h e r wis e a ll
p r o p o s e d e qu ilib r ia e xis t in d e p e n d e n t ly o f e a c h o t h e r . Fin a lly, t h e s e p a r a t -
in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. a n d t h e p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. a r e o b vio u s ly m u t u a lly
e xc lu s ive b y ( 2 ) .
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 3 :
B y L e m m a 1 wit h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r H C a c qu is it io n is c h o s e n wh e n e ve r
it is a ls o e ± c ie n t wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n e xc e p t fo r t h e c a s e wh e r e ( 2 ) is fu l-
¯ lle d a n d q < ^q. In t h is c a s e , if t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r , g r e e n ¯ e ld
in ve s t m e n t t a ke s p la c e e ve n t h o u g h a c qu is it io n wo u ld h a ve b e e n e ± c ie n t .
Q.E .D .
3 0P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 4 :
H C c a n g a in o n ly if MN E o ®e r s m o r e t h a n t h e a c t u a l p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t
fo r H C. Th is h a p p e n s if ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d q ¸ ^q, b u t t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r
a s p illo ve r . In t h is c a s e MN E m a ke s a h ig h o ®e r , PA = ¼1, if H C is p r iva t e ly
in fo r m e d , wh ile MN E wo u ld m a ke a lo w o ®e r , PA = ¹¼, wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
Co n d it io n ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d if t h e t e c h n o lo g y d i®e r e n c e a n d / o r t h e p o t e n t ia l
s p illo ve r , i.e . ¹c1 ¡ c2 a n d / o r ¢ = ¹c1 ¡ c1, a r e n o t t o o la r g e a s in s p e c t io n o f
c o n d it io n ( 2 0) in p r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 1 d is p la ys . In a ll o t h e r s it u a t io n s H C
r e c e ive s t h e s a m e p a yo ® wit h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a s wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 5 :
MN E s u ®e r s fo r m p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n if e it h e r t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m is a c qu ir e d
t o o e xp e n s ive o r a c qu is it io n in e ± c ie n t ly n o t t a ke s p la c e . Th is c a n h a p p e n
o n ly if ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d . In t h is c a s e if q ¸ ^q MN E o ®e r s t o o m u c h if t h e r e is n o
p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r o r if q < ^q MN E o ®e r s t o o lit t le a n d t h u s a c qu is it io n
n o t t a ke s p la c e if a s p illo ve r a c t u a lly o c c u r s . In a ll o t h e r s it u a t io n s MN E
r e c e ive s t h e s a m e p a yo ® wit h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a s wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 6 :
W it h fu ll in fo r m a t io n if c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is m e t b u t ( 2 ) is n o t fu l¯ lle d a n d
a s p illo ve r o c c u r s , MN E c h o o s e s g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t s in c e a c qu is it io n a t
p r ic e PA = ¼1 is t o o e xp e n s ive r e la t ive t o t h e m o n o p o ly p r o ¯ t . If n o s p illo ve r
o c c u r s MN E a c qu ir e s t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m a t p r ic e PA = ¹¼1. W it h p r iva t e
in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e in p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. b e c o m e s
PA = E[¼1] a n d t h is is a lwa ys a c c e p t e d . Th e r e fo r e , t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e is
lo w e n o u g h fo r a c qu is it io n t o b e p r o ¯ t a b le e ve n if t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a
s p illo ve r . S in c e fo r c e r t a in p a r a m e t e r c o n s t e lla t io n s t h e p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m
1. e xis t s , if ( 3 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d s im u lt a n e o u s ly ( 2 ) vio la t e d , p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n
fo r MN E m a y t h u s le a d t o m o r e a c qu is it io n s t h a n fu ll in fo r m a t io n .
Q.E .D .
3 1P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 7 :
B y L e m m a 2 wit h p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E , if c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is m e t , in
s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. o r p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. a c qu is it io n in e ± c ie n t ly
d o e s n o t t a ke p la c e if t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r . Th e r e fo r e , p r iva t e
in fo r m a t io n h a s a n e g a t ive e ®e c t o n t h e a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y. H o we ve r , b y
P r o p o s it io n 6 p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. le a d s u n d e r c e r t a in c o n d it io n s t o m o r e
a c qu is it io n s t h a n fu ll in fo r m a t io n . B u t o ve r a ll t h is p o s it ive e ®e c t o n t h e a c -
qu is it io n a c t ivit y is m o r e t h a n o ®s e t b y t h e t wo n e g a t ive e ®e c t s .
Mo r e fo r m a lly, p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. r e s u lt s in a c qu is it io n s wh ic h wo u ld n o t
h a ve t a ke n p la c e u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n wit h in t h e p a r a m e t e r s p a c e in wh ic h
c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) a r e m e t a n d c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is vio la t e d . S e p a r a t in g
e qu ilib r iu m 2. a n d p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. m a y r e s u lt in g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t -
m e n t , wh ile fo r fu ll in fo r m a t io n a c qu is it io n wo u ld h a ve t a ke n p la c e wit h in
t h e p a r a m e t e r s p a c e in wh ic h c o n d it io n ( 3 ) is n o t fu l¯ lle d b u t c o n d it io n s ( 1 )
a n d ( 4 ) a r e m e t . S in c e c o n d it io n s ( 2 ) a n d ( 3 ) c r o s s fo r s o m e va lu e o f q 2 ( 0 ;1 )
t h e fo r m e r p a r a m e t e r s p a c e m u s t b e m o r e r e s t r ic t e d t h a n t h e la t t e r .27
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 8 :
Fr o m t h e vie w o f H C in p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e PA =
E[¼1] is t o o s m a ll c o m p a r e d t o t h e a c c e p t a b le o ®e r u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n if
t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r a n d it is t o o la r g e o t h e r wis e . Th e r e fo r e , H C
s u ®e r s fr o m p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E in t h e fo r m e r c a s e , wh ile it g a in s in
t h e la t t e r . In a ll o t h e r s it u a t io n s H C r e c e ive s a p a yo ® wh ic h is e qu iva le n t t o
it s p o s t g r e e n ¯ e ld p r o ¯ t in d e p e n d e n t ly o f wh e t h e r a c qu is it io n o r g r e e n ¯ e ld
in ve s t m e n t is c h o s e n .
Q.E .D .
27See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration. In Figure 1 the parameter space for which
pooling equilibrium 1. results in more acquisitions is represented by the triangle between
the lines (2) and (3) and q = 0. The other situation is represented by the triangle between
the lines (1) and (3) and q = 1. Note that the former space is always more restricted than
the latter independently of the exact relation between conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4).
3 2P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 9 :
MN E g a in s fr o m h a vin g p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n o n ly in p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m if
t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r . In t h is s it u a t io n t h e a c qu is it io n p r ic e PA =
E[¼1] is s m a lle r t h a n it wo u ld b e wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n . Th e m u lt in a t io n a l
c a n n o t t a ke a d va n t a g e o f it s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n in a n y o t h e r s it u a t io n . On
t h e o t h e r h a n d , MN E a c qu ir e s H C a t a t o o h ig h p r ic e in p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m
1. if n o s p illo ve r wo u ld h a ve o c c u r e d . Mo r e o ve r , MN E a ls o s u ®e r s fr o m b e in g
p r iva t e ly in fo r m e d if c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d a s p illo ve r d o e s n o t o c c u r .
In t h is c a s e wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n a c qu is it io n wo u ld h a ve b e e n e ± c ie n t b u t
g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is c h o s e n if MN E is p r iva t e ly in fo r m e d .
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 1 0 :
Fir s t , we d e r ive t h e e xp e c t e d p a yo ®s fo r MN E fo r t h e d i®e r e n t in fo r m a t io n a l
s c e n a r io s .
1 . Fu ll In fo r m a t io n :
E[¼1] = q¼1 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼1:
( a) E[¼2] = ¼
M
1 ¡ E[¼1], if c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) a r e fu l¯ lle d .
( b) E[¼2] = q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) [¼
M
1 ¡ ¹¼1], if o n ly c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d .
( c) E[¼2] = q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼2, if n o n e o f t h e c o n d it io n s is fu l¯ lle d .
2 . P r iva t e In fo r m a t io n fo r H C:
( a) E[¼2jq ¸ ^q] = ¼
M
1 ¡ ¼1 o r
E[¼2jq < ^q] = q¼2+( 1 ¡q) [¼
M
1 ¡¹¼1], if c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) a r e fu l¯ lle d .
( b) E[¼2] = q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) [¼
M
1 ¡ ¹¼1], if o n ly c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d .
( c) E[¼2] = q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼2, if n o n e o f t h e c o n d it io n s is fu l¯ lle d .
3 . P r iva t e In fo r m a t io n fo r MN E :
E[¼1] = q¼1 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼1:
3 3( a) E[¼2] = ¼
M
1 ¡ E[¼1], if ( 3 ) is fu l¯ lle d .
( b) E[¼2] = q[¼
M
1 ¡ ¼1] + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼2, if c o n d it io n s ( 2 ) a n d ( 4 ) a r e fu l¯ lle d .
( c) E[¼2] = q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼2, if ( 2 ) is n o t fu l¯ lle d .
Co m p a r is o n o f t h e d i®e r e n t e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t s fo r MN E s h o ws t h a t t h e fu ll
in fo r m a t io n e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t a lwa ys we a kly d o m in a t e s t h e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t
wit h a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n . Mo r e p r e c is e ly, e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t s wh e n H C h a s
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a r e e qu a l t o t h e fu ll in fo r m a t io n c a s e e xc e p t in ( a ) wh e r e
t h e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n is h ig h e r :
1 : ¼
M
1 ¡E[¼1] > ¼
M
1 ¡¼1, wh ic h o b vio u s ly is fu l¯ lle d .
2 : ¼
M
1 ¡E[¼1] > q¼2+( 1 ¡q) [¼
M
1 ¡¹¼1] , ¼
M
1 > ¼1+¼2, wh ic h is fu l¯ lle d b y ( 2 ) .
N o w we c o m p a r e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t s wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n a n d wit h p r iva t e
in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E . P o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 1. a n d fu ll in fo r m a t io n yie ld t h e
s a m e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t if ( 2 ) is m e t . Ot h e r wis e if ( 2 ) is n o t fu l¯ lle d t h e e xp e c t e d
p r o ¯ t wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n is h ig h e r :
q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) [¼
M
1 ¡ ¹¼1] > ¼
M
1 ¡ E[¼1] , ¼1 + ¼2 > ¼
M
1 :
S e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. a lwa ys yie ld s a lo we r e xp e c t e d p a yo ® t h a n t h e fu ll
in fo r m a t io n e xp e c t e d p a yo ®:
¼
M
1 ¡E[¼1] > q[¼
M
1 ¡¼1]+( 1 ¡q) ¹¼2 , ¼
M
1 > ¹¼1+¹¼2 , wh ic h is fu l¯ lle d b y ( 2 ) .
Fin a lly, p o o lin g e qu ilib r iu m 3. yie ld s t h e s a m e e xp e c t e d p a yo ® a s wit h fu ll
in fo r m a t io n if ( 1 ) is vio la t e d . Ot h e r wis e if ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d t h e fu ll in fo r m a t io n
e xp e c t e d p a yo ® is la r g e r :
q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) [¼
M
1 ¡ ¹¼1] > q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼2 , ¼
M
1 > ¹¼1 + ¹¼2:
Q.E .D .
P r o o f o f P r o p o s it io n 1 1 :
H C's e xp e c t e d p a yo ® is e qu a l t o
E[¼1] = q¼1 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼1
3 4e xc e p t fo r t h e c a s e o f p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r H C a n d c o n d it io n ( 1 ) fu l¯ lle d .
In t h is c a s e if ( 1 ) is m e t t h e e xp e c t e d p a yo ® is
E[¼1jq ¸ ^q] = ¼1; o r
E[¼1jq < ^q] = q¼1 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼1:
Th u s , H C a lwa ys r e c e ive s t h e s a m e e xp e c t e d p a yo ® wit h t h e a b o ve e xc e p t io n
in a ll c a s e s . S in c e fo r q ¸ ^q t h e e xp e c t e d p a yo ® is la r g e r , H C ( we a kly) p r e fe r s
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n .
Q.E .D .
Relative r elation between conditions (1) - (4):
Fig u r e 1 : R e la t io n o f c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) - ( 4 ) u n d e r qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n .
3 5C) Asymmetr ic infor mation and pr ice competition
W e will n o w s h o w t h a t t h e e ®e c t s o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n a b o u t a p o -
t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r o n t h e e n t r y m o d e r e m a in qu a lit a t ive ly t h e s a m e
fo r t h e c a s e o f p r ic e c o m p e t it io n wit h h o r iz o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t s .
H e n c e , a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n r e d u c e s t h e p a r a m e t e r s p a c e fo r wh ic h a c -
qu is it io n is t h e o p t im a l e n t r y m o d e . Th e m a in d i®e r e n c e is t h a t c o n d it io n
( 1 ) is m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n ( 2 ) , a s a lr e a d y s h o wn in P r o p o s it io n 2 .
Th e e ®e c t s o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n d i®e r wit h r e s p e c t t o t h e e qu ilib -
r iu m a c qu is it io n o ®e r , if t h e d o m e s t ic ¯ r m h a s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t
p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s :
Lemma 5 The equilibrium acquisition o®er is
(a) PA = ¼1 if condition (1) is ful¯lled and q ¸ ^q,
or if only condition (2) is ful¯lled and q ¸ ~q,
(b) PA = ¹¼1 if condition (1) is ful¯lled and q < ^q,








P r o o f:
A s a r g u e d in p r o o f o f L e m m a 1 , MN E will o ®e r PA = ¼1, PA = ¹¼1 o r PA = 0
d e p e n d in g o n t h e e ± c ie n c y o f a c qu is it io n a n d o n t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r .
If ( 1 ) is m e t , a c qu is it io n is e ± c ie n t in d e p e n d e n t ly o f a s p illo ve r . MN E p r e fe r s
t o o ®e r PA = ¼1 in s t e a d o f PA = ¹¼1, if t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r q is h ig h
e n o u g h s u c h t h a t t h e g a in fr o m b e c o m in g a m o n o p o lis t o u t we ig h s t h e lo s s o f
a t o o h ig h o ®e r in c a s e t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a s p illo ve r :
¼
M






1 ¡ ¹¼1 ¡ ¼2
= ^q:
W h e r e ^q 2 ( 0 ;1 ) s in c e ¼1 > ¹¼1 a n d b y ( 2 ) . Ot h e r wis e MN E o ®e r s PA = ¹¼1.
3 6If o n ly c o n d it io n ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d a c qu is it io n is e ± c ie n t o n ly if t h e r e is p o t e n t ia l
fo r a s p illo ve r . MN E p r e fe r s t o o ®e r PA = ¼1 in s t e a d o f n o o ®e r , PA = 0 , if
t h e p r o b a b ilit y o f a s p illo ve r q is h ig h e n o u g h :
¼
M
1 ¡ ¼1 ¸ q¼2 + ( 1 ¡ q) ¹¼2
, q ¸




W h e r e ~q 2 ( 0 ;1 ) s in c e : 1 . ¼1+¹¼2 > ¹¼1+¹¼2 > ¼M
1 , b e c a u s e ( 1 ) is n o t fu l¯ lle d .
2 . ¹¼2 ¡ ¼2 > ¼1 + ¹¼2 ¡ ¼M
1 , ¼M
1 > ¼1 + ¼2 b y ( 2 ) .
Ot h e r wis e a c qu is it io n is n o t e ± c ie n t a n d h e n c e PA = 0 is c h o s e n .
Q.E .D .
L e m m a 5 s h o ws t h a t P r o p o s it io n 3 is va lid a ls o wit h p r ic e c o m p e t it io n .
A s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n r e d u c e s t h e p a r a m e t e r s p a c e fo r wh ic h a c qu is it io n
is t h e o p t im a l e n t r y m o d e . Th e r e a s o n fo r t h is is t h e fo llo win g . W it h p r i-
va t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t is c h o s e n , wh ile a c qu is it io n
is e ± c ie n t wit h fu ll in fo r m a t io n , if:
1 . ( 1 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d q < ^q.
2 . o n ly ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d q < ~q a n d a s p illo ve r o c c u r s .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , if ( 2 ) is fu l¯ lle d a n d q ¸ ~q b u t t h e r e is n o p o t e n t ia l fo r a
s p illo ve r , MN E c h o o s e s a c qu is it io n e ve n t h o u g h u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n g r e e n -
¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t wo u ld h a ve t a ke n p la c e . H o we ve r , o ve r a ll t h is p o s it ive e ®e c t
o n t h e a c qu is it io n a c t ivit y is m o r e t h a n o ®s e t b y t h e t wo n e g a t ive e ®e c t s .
If MN E h a s p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n a b o u t p o t e n t ia l t e c h n o lo g y s p illo ve r s
L e m m a 2 s t ill a p p lie s . Mo r e o ve r , P r o p o s it io n 7 r e m a in s a ls o u n c h a n g e d . In
c o n t r a s t t o qu a n t it y c o m p e t it io n c o n d it io n ( 1 ) is m o r e r e s t r ic t ive t h a n ( 2 ) .
A s a c o n s e qu e n c e , t h e r e c a n n o t e xis t p a r a m e t e r c o n s t e lla t io n s wh e r e u n d e r
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E a c qu is it io n t a ke s p la c e e ve n t h o u g h wit h fu ll
in fo r m a t io n MN E wo u ld h a ve c h o s e n g r e e n ¯ e ld in ve s t m e n t . H o we ve r , t h e r e
a r e c a s e s wh e r e MN E m a ke s n o a c qu is it io n o ®e r e ve n t h o u g h t h is wo u ld h a ve
b e e n e ± c ie n t u n d e r fu ll in fo r m a t io n , i.e . in s e p a r a t in g e qu ilib r iu m 2. Th u s ,
p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n fo r MN E r e d u c e s t h e p a r a m e t e r s p a c e fo r wh ic h a c qu is i-
t io n is t h e o p t im a l m o d e o f e n t r y. Fig u r e 2 g ive s a g r a p h ic a l illu s t r a t io n o f
3 7c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) - ( 4 ) u n d e r p r ic e c o m p e t it io n :
Relative r elation between conditions (1) - (4):
Fig u r e 2 : R e la t io n o f c o n d it io n s ( 1 ) - ( 4 ) u n d e r p r ic e c o m p e t it io n wit h h o r i-
z o n t a lly d i®e r e n t ia t e d p r o d u c t s .
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